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Spain’s return to “Old Europe”: 
Background and Consequences 
of the March 11 and 14, 2004 
Terrorist Attacks and Elections
♣ 
 
 
Introduction 
 
It is hard to fully understand the ultimate goal and some of the key arguments made by 
former Prime Minister of Spain José María Aznar during a limited series of public 
appearances performed since he left office just before the elections of March 14, 2004, in 
which he voluntarily did not run. Observers and scholars still wonder as to the real 
motivations behind a pattern that seems to be solely geared towards delivering a criticism 
of mostly foreign policy dimensions of the current government of Spain that unseated his 
Popular Party. Through a European-wide prism, and more specifically through a U.S. 
perspective, this behavior is a novelty, if not a blatant example of protocol-breaking. It is 
indeed unusual that a former high official uses foreign travels (especially in the land of a 
traditional ally) to send barbs towards his own democratically elected government, as if it 
were an exile experience. In concrete U.S. terms, it is a custom that a president who 
either decides not to run, is barred from reelection by constitutional mandate, or is 
defeated at the booth, leaves the scene quietly, offers a loyalty oath to the new leader and 
lets the representatives of his party in Congress deal with the imperfections of the foreign 
or domestic policy of the new administration. 
This civilized rule, elevated to the status of law in the United States, seems not to 
apply to the latest holder of the highest elected office in Spain. Moreover, what seems 
even odder about the behavior of José María Aznar is that he has been executing a 
systematic critique of the new foreign policy of his successor under the shadow of the 
White House, if not by the blessing and encouragement of President Bush, just before his 
reelection and most acutely after he was confirmed by a relative majority of the American 
people. 
Reasonable commentators, Spaniards and more specifically Americans, cannot 
imagine how, for example, President George Bush Sr., just months after suffering defeat  
                                                 
♣Paper presented at the International Studies Association annual meeting held in Honolulu, Hawaii, on 
March 1-5, 2005. A work in progress version was earlier presented at the Canadian European Union 
Studies Association meeting held in Montreal, Quebec, Canada, on May 28-29, 2004. Initial research for 
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2 
at the polls facing Bill Clinton (“it’s the economy, stupid!”), would accept an offer of,  
let’s say, La Sorbonne, and deliver a series of lectures in Paris in each case using a point 
to ridicule Clinton’s foreign policy. Lyndon Johnson, declining to run for reelection, 
would had never entertained the thought of going to Canada, accepting an offer of 
MacGill to lecture on the errors of Nixon’s overtures to China. Not even the wildest 
imaginations in the United States could envision Jimmy Carter giving speeches at 
Cambridge lambasting Reagan’s policies in the Caribbean. Why then Aznar has engaged 
in such disloyal behavior, under the auspices of Georgetown University, one of the 
respected universities in the United States, probably one of the jewels of Catholic 
educational entities on the planet, and recognized as a part of the elite of higher learning 
centers founded by the Jesuits?
1  
The answer is complex, but it probably includes a miscalculation on the part of 
the Georgetown University’s administration that invited him when he was to leave office. 
University officials could not predict then the defeat of his party at the polls and the 
subsequent embarrassment for his resentment in facing the change of policies 
implemented by the PSOE. Explanations possibly also include the fact that a natural 
constituency of Georgetown University alumni is conservative. However, this thesis 
clashes with the fact that the bulk of the student body and faculty actually opposed the 
war on Iraq.               
Presented as a series of lectures inserted in seminars offered at the School of 
Foreign Service at Georgetown University, at least one event in Miami sponsored by 
GU’s local Latin American alumni chapter (mostly of Cuban extraction), and in a   
handful of other appearances and op-ed pieces (The Wall Street Journal, a favorite), 
Aznar has offered an anthology of his own historical interpretations of world politics and 
his views of some of the new twists in foreign policy performed by PSOE Secretary 
General  José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, elected as Presidente del Gobierno as a result of 
the election of March 14. 
While the text of the speeches themselves don’t seem to be controversial per se 
and they are limited to generalizations regarding world views and the best way to face the 
current threats of terrorism, failed states, and economic ills, it often happens that 
impromptu questions fielded at the end of his lectures and dinners evolve into an 
expansion of certain ideas alluded in the main part of his expositions. Clichés, historical 
oddities, topic avoidance, and dubious humor take center stage. 
For example, when asked by a student at his first appearance at Georgetown as to 
why he made the decision to side with Bush on the war in Iraq, in opposition to an 
outstanding majority of the Spanish people, he answered that “the same number of people 
are opposed to terrorism”. As an explanation for the Madrid terrorist attacks, Aznar 
discarded Spain’s alliance with the United States in Iraq as the main cause, and pointed 
out that Ben Laden has had in mind the long Reconquista since 911 and nostalgia for the 
recovery of El Andalus. When asked for some specific move of the Spanish government, 
he would answer that he did not understand what the policy was and questions should be 
fielded to Madrid. In his second appearance and columns he accused the Spanish 
government of generating anti-Spanish feeling in Spain. However, when faced with an 
unrelated question regarding the existence of a Spanish space agency, he answered that 
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there was no such an entity, but that there should be one “to be able to send the Spanish 
government to Mars”.
2                      
Observers of the Spanish political scene still ask themselves why Aznar has been 
missing so many opportunities at home, before the elections, and specially after the 
defeat of the PP, to explain, within the natural political setting of the Spanish Congress, 
the rationale for his historic decision for siding, along with UK prime minister Tony Blair 
and some other European leaders, with the policy of George W. Bush in Iraq. Expecting 
to receive a collateral answer when he testified for a whole day to the special committee 
to investigate the terrorist attacks of March 11 (the Spanish September 11), instead, he 
stuck to his script claiming that he acted under the intelligence conviction that the culprits 
of the attacks on commuter trains were members of the Basque terrorist organization 
ETA, and not Islamic fundamentalists. This adamant claim, ultimately discovered as 
manipulation of evidence, led to his undoing and the defeat of his party. Thousands of 
additional voters (the PP received a similar number of votes than in the last election of 
2000) that in principle were going to abstain, rushed to the polling places and delivered a 
victory for the PSOE. In a way, it was the punishment for ignoring the bulk of Spanish 
opinion who opposed the war and the alliance with the United States. 
However, central questions remained unanswered. Enigmas persisted on the 
precise strategic, political and social motivations for taking such a leap step and 
sidelining the traditional alliances of post-Franco Spain in Europe and returning to a sort 
of betting on one isolated card as Franco did in the 50s. The difference this time was that 
Spain was in no need to desperately seek a place in the sun, out of the pariah status it was 
in the wake of World War II. The agreement to establish military bases in Spain meant 
that Spain became a de facto member of NATO with all the disadvantages and none of 
the advantages, but the pact meant the guarantee of the survival of the Franco 
dictatorship, some feat for  which the democratic left never forgave Washington. In 
contrast, for two decades Spain enjoyed full membership in the EU, was an example of 
international cooperation, its troops had contributed to dozens of peace keeping 
operations and its political transition was a model studied in practical text books in 
myriad universities and think-tanks around the world. Why Aznar manipulated history 
and wrongly claimed that Spain was still under the shadows of other European empires?          
In an expansion of his early critiques on his successor’s foreign policy, Aznar 
used the proximity of the scheduled referendum for the ratification of the EU 
Constitution to remind audiences that he still prefers the Nice Treaty, under the claim that 
it was more beneficial to the interest of Spain and that it reinforced its power for blocking 
measures. In essence, in contrast with the absolute majority of Spanish political parties 
(with the exception of the former communists and independence-seeking), he ventured to 
a sort of campaigning for abstention, to the dismay of his own Partido Popular that 
simultaneously joined the PSOE call for a “yes”. The trace of this reluctance towards a 
European consensus in which he always felt uncomfortable in Aznar expressions have 
prompted observers to wonder once more about the initial motivations for his U-Turn 
                                                 
2 General and specific critiques of different aspects of the new government’s foreign policy were issued in 
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available through CSPAN. Transcripts of some of the lectures were available in the webs of Georgetown 
and the FAES foundation.  See also Appendix (Miami 2005).  
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leaving “Old Europe” and embracing post-September 11 Washington. Was his frustration 
with the French-German axis the spark that fired his enthusiasm for Bush and Blair? Was 
the prospect of the termination of EU assistance funds a need to seek Washington’s 
cover?      
This monograph does not succeed in discovering the true explanations. It only 
explores certain avenues.                                                           
 
   
I 
 
Setting the Stage 
 
Spaniards and world-wide observers barely had recovered from the brutal terrorist attacks 
on March 11, 2004, in Madrid, when three days later, on Sunday, March 14, the Spanish 
electorate inflicted a stunning upset to the governing Popular Party (PP), which was 
ahead in the polls, catapulting Rodríguez Zapatero, as new Prime Minister of Spain, 
succeeding José María Aznar, and relegating polls-predicted new Prime Minister to be 
Mariano Rajoy to the opposition benches. The one-two punch rocked out not only the 
political scene of Spain but it also sent waves of nervous movements and concern from 
Washington and Brussels to Baghdad. The fact that the authorship of the coordinated 
bombing attack of commuter trains that claimed 202 lives and more than a thousand 
injured was attributed to Islamic fundamentalism made the Spanish tragedy similar in 
purpose and consequences to September 11. In fact, the coincidental dates baptized the 
Madrid terrorist attack as M-11.  
However, the twin events had diverse and different commentaries and assessment 
in Europe and in the United States. While one sector of public opinion and political 
leadership (mostly in the United States) rushed to label the Spanish electoral decision as 
appeasement to terrorists, other commentators (a majority in Europe) distinguished other 
causes for the defeat of the PP.
3 They especially targeted the handling of the crisis as the 
cause for the defeat, insisting on attributing the attack to the Basque terrorist 
organization, ETA. Accepting Islamic radicalism as the source of the bombings meant 
that Spain was finally the target of a reprisal for Aznar’s siding with President Bush in 
the war in Iraq, a move that was opposed by 90% of the Spanish citizens.
4 
While the linkage between the terrorist attack and the results of the election was 
undeniable, and the manipulation or bad management of the intelligence that the 
government had damaged the credibility of the PP leadership, other causes for the 
electoral disaster deserve also to be part of the overall explanation that needs to be 
considered. These factors are still present in the political and social fabric of Spain and 
Europe as a whole and will certainly have an effect on the future evolution of the 
European Union and its necessary alliance with the United States in the global fight 
against international terrorism.                                 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 For a review of the impact in the U.S. press, see appendixes labeled “Elections”.  
4 For a sample of data, see references in appendix (Opinion).   
5 
The year of living dangerously  
 
On Christmas eve of 2003, King Juan Carlos I of Spain delivered his traditional end of 
year televised message. Many personal experiences during the year were positive, 
including the engagement of his son, Prince Felipe de Borbón, to television 
anchorwoman Letizia Ortiz. However, political developments presented formidable 
challenges to Spain on three fronts. The war in Iraq had caused spectacular 
demonstrations and political divisions; the Spanish government manifested its 
disagreement with some proposals for the future of the European Union (EU); and the 
state’s cohesion was threatened by the pressures of regional nationalism (not only of the 
radical Basque variance, but also coming from the moderate Catalan factions). No 
wonder that the King’s speech, written by the Prime Minister’s office, went quickly over 
the difficulties while stressing satisfaction for economic growth and political stability.
5 
The issues to be addressed in 2004, however, had the remnants of crisis characteristic of 
much of 2003.         
Despite of 90% of public opinion disapproval, the Spanish government decided to 
support the United States in the Iraqi war. There was a rift between EU Member States 
(with Spain opposed to France and Germany) not only regarding Bush’s foreign policy, 
but also over crucial matters of the draft of the EU Constitution. The result was a collapse 
of the negotiations in December, and one of its worst historical crises in the history of 
this regional organization.  
Domestically, the commemoration of the 25th anniversary of the Spanish 
Constitution of 1978 highlighted its shortcomings on regional home rule and the 
inefficiency of the Senate. Basques (led by the centrist Basque Nationalist Party) had 
been threatening with an independence-seeking referendum. Incidentally, this project that 
was confirmed when the Basque parliament approved the final text in late 2004, and was 
then presented to the Spanish Congress and rejected by 90% of the political sectors. In 
turn, the new Catalan government forming a leftist coalition around the Socialist party, as 
a result of the elections in November 2003, has since been pressing for a reform of the 
autonomy statute, mostly regarding its economic conditions, but spreading to encompass 
a wider sovereignty in fields such as public order and international profile.  
Connecting these two regional challenges, the conservative Spanish government 
branded any substantial change in the degree of autonomy as unconstitutional. In the case 
of the Basque project, the Partido Popular, through its absolute (but isolated) majority in 
Congress, managed to pass a law criminalizing the potential Basque referendum motion 
which is not contemplated by the Constitution, prompting the opposition to expose 
banners protesting the move and volunteering to go to jail along with the Basques. 
Meanwhile, more than 300 criminal law professors labeled the law contrary to 
jurisprudence tradition. In any event, these moves were mooted by the presentation of the 
project to the Spanish Congress.   
In sum, Spain’s role in Europe was hardly influential through the year and ended 
based on the exercise of veto power. Its alliance with the United States was under 
constant internal questioning. Finally, the country was again faced with redefining its 
internal national identity.  
                                                 
5 This fact was not left unnoticed by the press: see editorial of El País, “Omisiones llamativas”, 26 
diciembre 2003.  
6 
While these three dimensions may seem to be independent of each other, a 
common denominator and a protagonist of all (as a reactive, more than an active factor) 
was the government of José María Aznar. He had suddenly decided to change course in 
the standing foreign policy bipartisan consensus crafted during the previous Social 
Democratic administrations, well grounded in its fundamentals in the centrist 
governments of the political transition period presided by prime ministers Suárez and 
Calvo Sotelo. Aznar drastically changed the anchoring of Spain in Europe and over-
stretched the mutually respectful relations with the United States. In the domestic arena, 
he had resurrected the centralist, conservative, and apparently long-time gone attitude 
that was the trademark of the Franco regime regarding the shape of Spain’s territorial 
structure. The combination of these latent factors contributed greatly to the PP’s failure 
once they were ignited by the dramatic terrorist events of March 11 and the erratic 
handling of the existing evidence by the government.      
                                    
 
A backdrop of Spain in the world             
  
Since overcoming the initial obstacles of its political transition from the Franco 
dictatorship to democracy in the late 1970s, Spain had been steadily and dramatically 
improvong its status in European and world affairs. Although world-wide popular 
opinion has barely surpassed the traditional stereotype, Spain’s image and perception in 
the field of academic analysis (most especially in the United States, but also widely 
evident in Europe and Latin America) has been substantially enriched over the last two 
decades. In consequence, its sudden placement in a spotlight role in the Iraq crisis 
merited closer attention by political columnists, specialized commentary, and scholarly 
analysis.  
  The novelty of the new situation deserved an urgent and, at the same time, steady 
and methodical search for the reasons behind the decision to endorse the U.S. policy in 
Iraq and the consequences of the actions taken and yet to be implemented. After all, the 
existing literature about Spain’s role in the world still marvels and simultaneously 
cautiously ponders the fast ascent of the country from a position of isolation to one of 
model and relative influence and power.  
The 2003 commemoration of the 25
th anniversary of the 1978 Spanish 
Constitution gave numerous observers and political forces a considerable excuse to 
critically evaluate the accomplishments of Spanish democracy, noticing its shortcomings 
as well as its successes. Overall, there was (and still is) an impressive consensus present 
in the academic scholarship, as well as in the political circles, that Spain’s position in the 
world scene has dramatically improved in the last quarter of a century due to its objective 
and balanced behavior and its role as an independent mediator, and contributor of 
development assistance. 
  In this context, the sudden decision to side with the United States in such a 
controversial environment surprised and angered numerous observers at home and abroad 
and widely opened the floodgates of political commentaries, mostly because the decision 
was, according to the standards of modern journalism, news – for some, bad news. 
Surprisingly for some government officials and Aznar’s backers, who were expecting to 
harvest the media benefits for Spain, U.S. public opinion paid scant attention, and had not  
7 
yet done so until the March 14 attacks, to the unconditional political endorsement given 
by the Spanish government to the U.S. policies.  
In the crucial weeks preceding the war, the persistent presence of the name of the 
Spanish Prime Minister in the press and the reference to the status of Spain as a member 
of the UN Security Council contrasted with the lack of depth in commentaries, a vacuum 
remaining unfulfilled with the limited number of press interviews and cursory reports.  
This trend was in a way repeated after the tragic media limelight suffered by Spain after 
the terrorist blow of March 11, and the attention given to the stunning results of the 
March 14 election.
6 Only time will say if Spain will remain as a permanent point of 
reference for U.S. attention.    
The blunt absence of commentaries in depth in March 2003 may be partially 
explained by the traditionally self-centered attitude of the United States toward world 
affairs. On the other hand, it was also a sign of the relative limitations of a minor 
international actor, simply overcompensated for by the calculations of the Spanish 
leadership. This may be again the case after the March 11 attacks.  
The symptom of the lack of a steady presence of Spain in the U.S. media is not 
surprising, considering that Spain does not have a very sharp and defined image in the 
United States, beyond the folkloric stereotype, and the positive reflection on different 
aspects of art and music. Yet, the absence of urgent commentaries represented in March 
2003 the other face of the constant mention of Spain in the crucial duo of support for 
George Bush. José María Aznar was competing with UK’s Tony Blair and France’s 
President Jacques Chirac, while he outranked Italy’s Berlusconi and Germany’s 
Schroeder, both sort of missing in action from the limelight of public opinion during the 
first weeks of the war.  
Still, from a strictly media angle, the protagonist role played by the Spanish leader 
during the weeks preceding the war contrasted with the one espoused by some of the 
most influential and powerful heads of European countries. This is, from the standard 
unwritten journalism code, that when “a man bites a dog,” it is news. Instead of electing a 
middle-of-the-road attitude (something that key leaders of the PP recommended at the 
time and now regret it was not followed by Aznar), which would have Spain claiming to 
opt for its insertion in the setting of multilateral arrangements and alluding to lack of 
economic and military resources to back Spain’s political endorsement, the unconditional 
attitude was starkly real news. Yet, public attention in the United States was (and still is, 
with the new exception of the March 11-14 events) absent. 
In clear contrast, the role of the Spanish government (and the implications for its 
future) erupted with spectacular force in Spain’s domestic arena. It became an explosive 
topic of political confrontation and acerbic media analysis with an unprecedented depth 
and acrimony, only comparable to some timely milestones of political crisis and 
developments in the last quarter century of Spanish democracy (among them the 
attempted coup of 1981).  
Moreover, the controversy caused by the decision on Iraq propelled to the surface 
of public forums the issue of latent anti-U.S. sentiment, perceived as a monopoly of the 
European left (and isolated cases of the extreme right in France). This trend was in the 
past reinforced by the U.S. backing of the Franco regime, guaranteeing with the 
agreement for the military bases the survival of the dictatorship as part of the strategic 
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security of the Cold War. Ironically, left and right observers may agree that, taken in 
historical terms, the Franco-Eisenhower pacts might have been justified for reasons of 
state –Spain was in desperate need of a minimum of international anchoring. In contrast, 
the decisive and drastic agreement of the Spanish government with the U.S. policy in the 
Iraq crisis did not respond to an urgent need of the country, because Spain was well 
established in the international scene, enjoying considerable prestige in Europe and in the 
world in general. As a result of this anomaly, think tanks and scholars have already 
engaged in an in-depth analysis of a phenomenon perceived as responding to time-
passing eventualities, or as non-transitory, revealing a deeper, and more permanent crisis. 
Ironically, in contemporary Spain some particular conservative sectors have been 
critical of the United States since the defeat in the Spanish-American war. The Aznar’s 
endorsement of the policies of the United States had apparently confirmed the end of this 
historical ambivalence. As a consequence, a wide gap between a minority of public 
opinion and more than 90 percent of the electorate opposing the war became evident, 
shattering a prevalent compromise in foreign policy.      
In the special context of Spain’s place in the international community, the existing 
consensus emanating from decision-making circles and analytic sources is that the 
notable solid insertion of Spain (and especially through important personal appointments) 
in key international and supranational bodies (EU, NATO, UN, etc.) was made possible 
through a solid coalition forged between the PSOE and PP, when the Socialists were in 
power between 1982 and 1996.
7 This alliance in forging a real national foreign policy 
was deeply appreciated in Europe and the Americas, as it rendered considerable 
pragmatic benefits to the United States and Spain’s partners in the EU. Meanwhile, in 
Latin America Spanish mediation was requested for the pacification schemes in Central 
America and the development aid programs of the EU. Spain was, as it appeared to be a 
permanent trend, not “different” (as Franco’s slogan used to pitch in the 1960s) anymore. 
In view of the split in the context of the European Union (where apparently Spain was 
forced to side with the “new” Europe) and overall Latin American opposition or 
ambivalence to the U.S. strategy, the existing stabilizing and mediating role of Spain has 
been brought into question.  
 
A constant hot news issue 
 
Until the Madrid bombings, Spain had suffered selective personal damage as a 
consequence of its involvement in Iraq.  On August 19th, 2003, a brutal suicide truck 
bombing demolished part of the UN headquarters in Baghdad, killing Brazilian Sergio 
Viera de Mello, head of the UN mission, and twenty two other officers and workers, 
while causing serious injuries to many. Unnoticed among the injured was Spanish Navy 
Captain Manuel Martín Oar. While suffering apparently only superficial body damage, he 
died of brain trauma hours later while waiting for treatment on a stretcher placed on the 
street outside the gutted building. Attached to the UN mission as an assistant to the 
Spanish embassy, Captain Martín was Spain’s first military casualty not only of the 
                                                 
7 For a sample of the existing literature from the U.S. point of view, see the classic book by Kenneth 
Maxwell and Steven Spiegel, The New Spain: From Isolation to Influence. NY: Council of Foreign 
Relations, 1994.  
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overall conflict but also in the highly controversial relationship between the Spanish 
government and the United States in the Iraq crisis. His was the first of other coffins 
tragically filled with Spanish casualties to arrive in Madrid, a sensitive issue that became 
the center of acrimonious blame-attributed accusations between the government and the 
opposition.            
  A few days earlier, in the garden of the royal residence in Palma de Mallorca, the 
Balearic islands capital, just seconds after he was warmly received by King Juan Carlos I 
in the annual protocol summer visit, Aznar ended a customary press conference that is 
usually reduced to small talk, with a dramatic remark. In a controversial cautionary 
manner, he stated he felt “sorry” for those “who are going to be glad when Spanish 
soldiers come back from Iraq in coffins.” This statement was perceived as a shocking and 
veiled “pre-emptive strike” (according to the label used by journalists) against the 
opposition.  
The incident was badly taken by the King, whose relations with Aznar had been 
characterized by well-informed press as cold and distant. Jealous of getting upstaged by 
the popular monarch, the Prime Minister was notorious for pointing out that the role of 
the King was constitutionally limited and from the political point of view had to adhere to 
specific functions. The most famous occasion for taking the opportunity for remarking on 
the political dependency of the King was when Aznar answered a press conference 
question regarding a possible trip of Juan Carlos I to Cuba with a terse: “he will go when 
he is due” (“cuando toque”). The Palma de Mallorca threat was the icing on the cake for a 
royal family that has felt much better treated by the Socialist administrations of Felipe 
González than in the eight years of conservative administration.                    
In any event, the unfortunate comment was strategically placed in the background 
of the aggressive tactics executed by the opposition against the Spanish government’s 
policy in backing the U.S. effort in Iraq by sending Spanish troops to substitute for 
occupation-weary GIs. Aznar’s comments, while in tune with previous confrontations, 
caught his political opponents off-guard while most of Spain was experiencing the worst 
and longest heat wave of the century. The media commentary and the response issued by 
the opposition were the aperitif of what seasoned observers predicted were going to be 
harsh political battles in the fall. The new political season was going to be a mix of 
electoral confrontations and historical commemorations (the September 26
th 50
th 
anniversary of the U.S.-Spanish agreement for the establishment of military bases in 
Spain, the December 6
th anniversary of the Spanish Constitution of 1978), all leading to 
the finale of the national parliamentary elections of March 2004 for the renewal of the 
Spanish Congress.                  
  In August 2003 over a thousand Salvadoran, Honduran, Dominican and 
Nicaraguan troops arrived at Spanish military airports and briefly received routine 
training for a few days at a lightly used military installation in northeastern Catalonia. 
Their final destination was Iraq, where they were inserted into a multinational division 
led by Polish officers, under the overall oversight of a Spanish general. Scheduled to 
substitute U.S. troops in occupation duties in central Iraq, the Spanish and Latin 
American troops were organized into a brigade of about 2,500 men and women, named 
Plus Ultra (one of the mottos of the Spanish coat of arms). After the March 14 elections, 
Prime Minister-elect, Rodríguez Zapatero, recalled that his electoral campaign included 
the return of the Spanish troops, unless there was a UN mandate. Immediately,  
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Salvadoran authorities issued a statement in the sense that their troops would have to 
follow this lead, not for political reasons, but because of the heavy military and 
equipment dependency on the Spanish command.
8  
As this study will show later, this unique Latin American dimension of Spain’s 
role in Iraq is not isolated but also linked with a novel profile of the overall Ibero-
American and Hispanic legacy in relations with the United States. Moreover, the 
presence of Spanish troops in Iraq became the subject of the first declarations of the 
newly elected Prime Minister when he reminded the United States of his campaign 
promise to withdraw them by June 30, 2004, unless there was to be a UN mandate. The 
Spanish troops and the apparent Moroccan origin of the perpetrators of the Madrid 
criminal attacks have something more in common. Eventually, Zapatero, accurately 
predicting a rejection of a UN mandate, complied with his electoral promise and ordered 
the return of the Spanish troops, sending tremors to the U.S. political and media 
establishment and angering the Spanish opposition.            
 
The Moroccan dimension  
                
As part of the tiny but rigorously trained elite of the Spanish military, some of the troops 
belong to the Spanish Legion contingent based in the southern Andalusian province of 
Almería. Feared in times gone as the harshest of the Spanish armed forces, veterans of 
colonial wars in North Africa and as elite units for Franco’s rebellion during the Spanish 
Civil War, the Legion nowadays is the first one to be called to serve in humanitarian 
missions, such as in the former Yugoslavia. Its latest action, however, was in July 2002 
when it was commissioned to dislodge half a dozen Moroccan policemen who were sent 
to “occupy” a deserted inlet named Perejil (parsley, in English), located just a couple 
hundred yards from the Moroccan coast, legally under Spanish sovereignty, but claimed 
by Morocco along with other cities and outposts as historical relics of colonial eras.
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After Spain’s premier decided to confront this challenge with swift military action 
he then had to obtain assurances that a repeat attempt was not in the horizon before 
leaving the inlet as it was before the incident. Aznar then turned his head toward Brussels 
for the necessary backing. He received it, but the ambivalence expressed by the French 
government towards scolding Morocco, convinced Aznar that he needed a more 
convincing warranty: the United States. A series of calls settled the issue at least 
temporarily and confirmed Aznar’s lack of confidence in France’s Chirac. Less than a 
year later, Aznar would reaffirm his loyalty to Bush in exchange for his help in this 
matter when the United States decided to go to war in Iraq. 
In an ever confrontational climate with Morocco, just days before the election, 
Spain’s Minister of Defense, Federico Trillo, winding down a campaign stop, after an 
apparently ebullient dinner with PP supporters was caught on TV tape as regretting not 
being in his post years ago (he was President of the Parliament) to have the opportunity 
of “invading” Perejil “permanently”. He was also filmed as mocking past leaders of the 
PSOE. The opposition made this commentary part of the campaign claiming a reckless 
and dangerous behavior in times of uncertainty, while PP prudent leaders censored 
Trillo’s wrong step. It was probably his last public appearance.             
                                                 
8 See Appendix (Central America).  
9 See Appendix (Perejil)  
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The assassination of Captain Martín was the prelude to the ambush and brutal 
killing of seven Spanish Secret Service agents south of the Iraqi capital, apparently as 
part of a series of targeted attempts against selective representatives of European forces 
serving in the ad-hoc coalition in the occupation of the country. Italian and Polish 
soldiers were also the victims of activity of the Iraqi insurgency (a term widely used by 
the U.S. press and government) before and after the capture of Saddam Hussein. 
The funeral of the Spanish agents served as a trigger for a series of accusations 
and demands made by the Spanish opposition, pressuring the government for a definition 
of the status of the military forces, and setting the stage for future confrontations. The 
year ended with the surprise trip made by Aznar to visit the soldiers serving in Iraq, 
mirroring the spectacular appearance by President Bush to be with the American troops 
for a few hours on Thanksgiving Day.          
                           
A polemic choice 
 
In summary, the mission to be performed by the Plus Ultra brigade was the culmination 
of a controversial decision made by the Aznar government, to back President Bush’s 
strategy in Iraq. Aznar, disregarding an overwhelming majority of the Spanish public 
opinion, took a political initiative alongside British Prime Minister Tony Blair in leading 
the effort at the United Nations Security Council (where Spain was a non-permanent 
member) to justify the U.S. military action against Iraq.  
Political opposition and massive demonstrations in Spain were the most 
impressive in Europe in the weeks preceding the U.S.-led attacks and subsequent 
occupation. Street actions were so spectacular that they even caught the attention of 
former President George H. Bush who was lecturing in Buenos Aires –“the foreign policy 
of the United States cannot be subject to a demonstration in… Barcelona”. The comment 
was initially perceived by Barcelona observers as giving the Catalan capital a good 
publicity, but keener analysts detected a sort of put down degrading reasoning of the 
former president. Barcelona was apparently not that important as Paris, Berlin or London. 
This patronizing attitude came to the surface of U.S. opinion when Spanish voters ousted 
Aznar in the wake of the attacks. Exaggerated applause and outcry for the decision 
revealed a superiority attitude from U.S. columnists. It also uncovered apprehension of a 
spill-over effect of the Spanish decision to other “more important” countries, and 
especially Europe as a whole.          
The result of the polemic decision taken by Aznar in March of 2003 in the EU 
context was that the European political map was badly fractured. On one side, France, 
Germany and some other EU-old timers, confirmed their opposition to the war plans. On 
the other side, Spain, the United Kingdom, Italy, and a number of the newcomers to the 
EU supported the pro-U.S. position.  
This division was, for all practical purposes, the partial result of the stunning 
positioning of Spain in the so-called “new Europe” band, as graphically crafted by the 
world famous expression coined by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. This 
European faction was opposing an “old” Europe led by France and Germany. For a 
nation-state with a history of over one thousand years, once dominating the European 
scene, it was ironic that Spain was now allied with the most recent members to the 
European Union, in a coalition far from the traditional European power centers, while  
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closer to London and Washington. It was not coincidental that Spain became an ally of 
Poland (under which command the Spanish troops were placed in Iraq) in the stubborn 
opposition of France and Germany when considering the final text of the EU 
Constitution. It was also intriguing to witness that after the Spanish election; Polish 
authorities started backtracking in their endorsement of the U.S. strategy in Iraq and 
announced a new, moiré flexible attitude when considering again the voting conditions of 
the EU Constitution. Many Spaniards took the issue with a grain of humor after the 
election, stating that they awoke on Sunday, March 14, in “Old” Europe, and went to bed 
in “New” Europe.         
In the Spanish domestic political arena, the decision to back the U.S. war plans 
caused serious damage to the established foreign policy consensus crafted between the 
previous Socialist government and Aznar’s Partido Popular. Public, political and 
intellectual attitudes towards the United States suffered noticeably impact, prompting 
observers to pay close attention to new trends and similarities with previous patterns.
10  
 
II 
Methods and Aims 
 
Motivations of a polemical decision 
 
In expectation of what some time in the near future will probably be a substantial body of 
analysis generated by academic and think tank specialists in the rest of Europe and the 
United States, this monograph, as originally designed, intended simply to contribute in a 
limited pioneer fashion to what was predicted would be a distinctive chapter of 
scholarship in the field of Spain’s politics and foreign relations. The events of March 11-
14 considerably changed, in a more dramatic way, the scope and results. But certain 
original purposes still remain basically valid, if not more relevant. 
In a U.S. context, in the days preceding the Iraq war, the limited samples of 
American media commentary on the attitude of Spanish Prime Minister Aznar allowed us 
to have a glimpse of the different dimensions of a possible profile that a more specialized 
inquiry could offer in the future, if for only historical purposes. Some themes are outlined 
in several scant press reports published during the Azores Summit (attended by the U.S. 
President and the British, Spanish and Portuguese Prime Ministers) which took place was 
on the eve of the war. 
First, and most importantly, a central thought dominated the state of mind of 
observers: Why was Aznar taking such a political risk when facing internal protests 
against the war? Second, was he impelled by his conviction that this was “the right thing 
to do” based on values and not on electoral calculations? Compared to the “special 
relationship” of the United Kingdom with the United States, as a central justification for 
Blair’s decision, observers were wondering, what was the “special reason” for Spain’s 
support? More in depth, did Aznar’s decision to back President Bush respond heavily to 
wanting his nation “in ascendance” to play in the “major leagues”, as he declared to the 
U.S. media?  
On a more practical level, researchers and casual observers may still ask if a U.S. 
promise of help in terminating the threat of Basque terrorism was what propelled him to 
                                                 
10 For a selection of media impact, see Appendix (USA).    
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action. If so, ironically (or tragically, it depends) when he insisted on ETA’s authorship 
of the March 11 attack he simultaneously admitted the impotence of the U.S. backing in 
fighting the domestic threat. More dramatically, how influential was his wish not to be 
forced to live “kneeling” under the menace of terrorism? More personally, how lasting 
had been his traumatic experience of escaping a terrorist life threatening attempt for 
making this decision? In sum, the key question in this terrain was (and still is, even in a 
more distinctive way after his defeat): what impact did Spain’s experience with terrorism 
have on Aznar’s decisions? The answer remains to be determined. Moreover, ETA’s 
terrorism was not only always behind all his considerations but significantly caused in 
great part such an obsession that it contributed to his party’s downfall when Aznar 
insisted on the Basque origin of the bombing.   
However, as in the case of the motivations of Spanish voters in the election, 
where other factors, in addition to the discovery of the Islamic authorship and its cover 
up, contributed to prompt voters to come out and punish him at the polls, observers of a 
more skeptical nature have dared to explore other explanations behind Aznar’s pragmatic 
motivations in siding with Bush. Some of these interpretations are now irrelevant, but 
others are still at least part of a historical lesson. 
For example, commentators had been wondering if he was offered a guarantee for 
the continuation of Spain’s sovereignty in the North Africa situated Spanish cities of 
Ceuta and Melilla in a reshaped geopolitical scenario, covering a wide region from 
Afghanistan to the Atlantic. Across the narrow sea dividing Europe and Africa, was it the 
future of Gibraltar, with a possible but doubtful co-sovereignty deal with the UK, being 
discussed as a pay-off? Across the Atlantic, was there a guarantee made by Bush of a 
“hands off” Spanish investment policy in Cuba? On a more ambitious setting, did Bush 
venture help with other economic interests in Latin America, mainly the spectacular 
Spanish investments in the last decade?  
Returning to Spain, how about rumors of an increase of U.S. investments in 
Spain, to offset the decrease of French and German economic activity, and as a means to 
ameliorate the negative balance of payments? Finally, all these diverse speculations and 
invitations for searching possible explanations for what was basically a Spanish backing 
for the U.S. strategy in a concrete scenario of the Middle East, Iraq, a more mundane, 
economic, pragmatic clarification has been in demand:  What could be the role for Spain 
in the new oil industry in Iraq, mirroring Spanish energy investments in Argentina, 
replacing the leading status of France? If oil was not the reason, then what about the 
consolation prize of reconstruction contracts in a dictatorship and war-ravaged zone, once 
the conflict had subsided?  
This kind of speculation still makes sense when reviewing the declarations made 
by President Bush’s brother, Florida Governor Jeb Bush, on the eve of a trip to Spain, 
when he impressed reporters with the promise and expectation of “incredible” profits 
(“beyond their imagination”, in a verbatim expression) and advantages for Spanish 
companies in what appeared to be a bonanza of contracts for reconstruction and world-
wide investment under the U.S. leadership. In fact, they never came into a reality.
11 
In any event, before the March 2004 events, it was premature to make any 
predictions for a noticeable change of the perception of Spain in popular and elite opinion 
in the United States. Before the conflict in Iraq, a factor to consider was how the war 
                                                 
11 See Appendix (Business).  
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events would develop and how the occupation and reconstruction would proceed in the 
following months. Nonetheless, no matter how “clean” the occupation was expected to be 
and how complicated the implications could develop for the world economy, it was not 
expected that the popular image of Spain would suffer notable changes. This prediction 
appeared to be correct once the actual war was over in just three weeks. The novelty then 
was what was going to be the perception of the Spanish military units, after the official 
war ended, sniping and selective attacks against U.S. forces began, and the first Spanish 
soldiers arrived in Iraq. Following past patterns, Spain’s role was destined to be as 
unnoticeable as its military impact was, in view of the limited dimensions of the Spanish 
contingent.     
 
Impact on national political identity 
    
Quite different in nature has been the soul searching for a new political identity of Spain 
as a result of the Iraqi conflict, both internally, especially within the context of the 
European Union. A central question in this Spanish search is the evaluation of the 
importance of the role that U.S. perceptions (ally, model, or threat) play in terms of 
Spanish interests. This question was set to be answered differently in the event of a 
change in Spanish leadership as a result of a series of elections scheduled to be held 
within a year, from the municipal and local autonomies in May of 2003 to the Spanish 
legislative and EU Parliament elections, to be held in March and June of 2004, 
respectively. How pivotal a role the U.S. policy would play as a domestic issue could 
only be answered according to the evolution of these events, case by case. 
As the results of the regional autonomous elections in Madrid and Catalonia 
demonstrated previously to the March 2004 national stunning upset, foreign issues had no 
impact on the results. Spanish voters seemed to be very mature and have managed to 
focus on their own domestic interests, with no perceivable distraction. “All politics are 
local”, Spaniards seem to adhere to the Tip O’Neill doctrine. However, as a correction to 
this view, the dormant Iraq issue exploded in the midst of the national vote.                       
Finally, additional questions required then further analysis. For example, was the 
move by the Spanish government towards a visible alliance with the United States the 
confirmation of a trend or a temporary circumstance heavily linked to the existing 
leadership? The central question, in any case, remained (and is still a mystery): Why? 
The parallel inquiry was: What were then the consequences for Spain’s internal affairs, 
future role in Europe, and perception in the world? How did the crisis and division of 
opinion in Spain affect the image of the United States in Spain?  Undoubtedly, these 
questions were brutally dramatized by the March 2004 events. We can only contribute to 
a provisional explanation of the new situation from the lessons of the past by examining 
documentary evidence and the record of anonymous opinions given by elite sources in 
government and media. 
 
 
Methodology  
  
The investigative base of the study, designed and executed before the March 2004 
dramatic events, was centered on the exhaustive monitoring of the elite and weekly press.  
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Then, a selective examination of the still scant output of think tank production, foreign 
policy analytical publications, and specialized journals was added to the picture. 
Simultaneously, the author conducted select interviews with representatives of the 
principal actors, secondary policy agents, international staffers, leaders of public opinion, 
and established scholars with considerable practice in academic analysis. These personal 
interviews were collated and compared with the media corpus, and two branches of the 
predominantly elite nature of the documentary sources used for the present analysis.  
The choice of using the press as an anchor for initial reflection is doubly justified. 
First, while in most of the West the press is an accurate mirror of public opinion, in 
Southern Europe and selective countries of Latin America the “reference” press reflects 
more acutely the elite expression, with a heavy dose of intellectual inclination. Second, 
the analysis of the press content became necessary because, in contrast with parallel 
controversy created in London, the debate in the Spanish Congress was very limited, 
sporadic and generally avoided by the government, well guarded by a comfortable 
partisan majority that remained to the very end loyal to the thesis of the Prime Minister.  
  In consequence, the result of the inquiry was frustrating with regard to the 
available corpus provided by either the Prime Minister and his office, or members of his 
party. On a limited number of occasions through appearances in Congress, PP members 
and especially Aznar, revealed a traditional conservative profile with not only Spanish 
specifications, but also curiously with a Latin American flair. Along European 
conservative thought, rich in explicit examples to justify the preservation or consolidation 
of the system endangered by revolutions or other challenges to the established order, 
survivor of the ancient regime, Spanish thought, even though with less energy and 
conviction, had a notable tradition, in a certain degree lost with the impoverishment 
inflicted by the Franco regime. In Latin America explicitly designed and expressed 
conservative thought (not simply intolerant attitude) is as absent as it is necessary for the 
consolidation of democracy, latent in the basic theses of liberalism. As interpreted by 
scholars of the foundational period, the key for the limitations of conservative thought 
resides in its link with the centralist mind set, anchored on the dogmatic justification of 
the conquest and the subsequent political and economic control. Threatened by 
constitutional liberalism, which will not change much of the social and economic 
structures of the colonies, de facto conservatism simply opposed change, avoiding debate 
in the market of ideas. A similar attitude has characterized the absence of explicit 
reasoning to justify the alliance set in motion in the Iraqi crisis. To the dismay of 
professional diplomats recruited at high levels of the Spanish administration during the 
second term of Aznar’s mandate, pleas for developing an open and well-designed 
campaign of explaining the strategic policy were summarily rejected. Only confidential 
and selective admission remains the only source for confirming this trend. Frustration and 
guilt reached such levels, that silence has become the norm.
12                           
All pattern of behavior, ironically, has been pointed out as contributing to the 
climate that led the Spanish government to stubbornly stick to the thesis of Basque 
authorship for the attacks, still under the comfortable position of denying a debate in 
Congress.        
 
 
                                                 
12 From confidential interviews held during the summer of 2004.   
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Towards a wider setting 
 
Although the present monograph (as originally designed, and more emphatically taking 
into account the electoral experience of March 2004) and supplementary documentation 
are limited in scope, it should be properly placed in an overall framework of a wider 
research project to be undertaken in the future. Some parallel topics dominate the skyline 
of this panorama, still open for future endeavors.  
As demonstrated by the notable interest expressed in some European countries 
(especially France), closer attention should be given to the image of the United States in 
Europe and especially in Spain. As expressed in the introductory lines, the present 
research should also be studied from the perspective of the perceptions of Spain in the 
United States. In both cases, the research agenda is wide open as a consequence of the 
March 2004 events. In the case of the U.S. image in Spain, an object of study worth 
considering will be the harsh attitude of commentators against the decision of the Spanish 
voters. In the case of the image of Spain, it all depends on the evolution of the new policy 
of the Spanish government and its consequences for the strategic U.S. interests.       
As a consequence, the limited results of this inquiry (initially focused on the pre-
March 2004 events) should then be expanded to pay due attention to the impact Spain’s 
actions has on its image in the United States. For historical reasons and a lesson for future 
decisions, Spanish interests, government officials, political leaders, and casual observers 
would still benefit from a systematic study of the impact of Spain’s decision in March 
2003 on its position in the European Union. In a wider context, researchers should review 
Spain’s position in the United Nations (leading to its finale, when it extracted an official 
declaration blaming the bombings on ETA). The new administration had to work very 
hard to repair the damage done by Spain’s representation under strict orders to follow a 
script which they probably do not believe. The same policy had to be implemented in 
Spain’s special relations in the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and Latin America. 
Ultimately, U.S. observers and backers of U.S. interests in Spain should monitor the 
consequences of Spain’s alliance with President Bush for the interests of the United 
States in Spain. This makes even more sense after the March 2004 election.  
 
Objective and aims 
  
With the above ideas in mind, the bulk of the paper intends to offer some glimpses of 
documentation and interpretation, with the hope of contributing to the general intellectual 
debate, supply a sample of scholarship, and deliver a modest dose of personal input. In 
consequence, the following pages have as a main objective the task of sharing a portion 
of the monitoring of the events that led to the traumatic terrorist attack and election, 
reviewing the existing literature, and evaluating the evolution and possible consequences 
(some of them dramatically confirmed) of the Spanish government’s decision to endorse 
the U.S. policy on Iraq. While the potential reshaping of Spain’s political and foreign 
policy status is the center of the analysis, the European and U.S. perception of Spain and 
the image of the United States in Europe and Spain will also receive considerable 
attention, if only hovering over the ongoing inquiry. The study of elite opinion, based 
mostly on selective media leaders, and sporadic studies generated by research centers and 
leading scholars, supplemented by interviews with influential leaders and observers,  
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constitute the framework of the methodology used. Mass popular opinion was only used 
as reflected in surveys provided by think tanks, government agencies, and independent 
poll taking institutes. 
 
III 
 
Findings 
 
Searching for explanations 
 
More than three years after the dramatic, tragic events of September 11, and two years 
after the decisive position taken by Aznar, observers of Spain’s political scene are still 
wondering about his precise motivations for taking this turn, trying to evaluate its impact 
on Spain’s role in the ever changing EU, and speculate about the permanent or transitory 
nature of the internal confrontations over relations with the United States. Apparently, 
nothing was supposed to be the same after the Spanish government’s decision in 2003. 
After the March 2004 electoral defeat this assessment has taken on another meaning. 
What remained to be seen before the bombings and the election was the degree and the 
depth of the consequences in the Spanish political and social psyche. After the sudden 
political change, the alliance of Aznar with Bush is still seen by the PSOE sector as a 
scar, in urgent need of correction by a radical surgery, not simply cosmetic, while 
repairing what is considered as an erroneous foreign policy. Before the March 2004 
election, there was a substantial degree of concern in the elite political circles (not limited 
to the PSOE entourage) regarding the future position of Spain in its most natural habitat –
the European Union. This context returned to be the center of attention for the new 
government.  
The exercise of reviewing Aznar's motivations has rendered some results that on 
the surface may seem to be surprising for casual observers, may raise some eyebrows in 
certain circles, and open questions in others regarding the sincerity of the officials and 
opinion leaders who were surveyed in total anonymity. For seasoned observers, however, 
the collective portrait seems to be the expected end product, with very few but subtle, 
interesting surprises. This collective panorama is mirrored by the content of the 
impressive volume of media analysis and commentaries generated by the controversial 
developments since mid 2002, and by the selective scholarly production available. 
Any search of this nature would have as a central axis the direct opinions of the 
main protagonists. In this case, the speeches, writings, media declarations and content of 
press conferences given by Aznar should be awarded a pivotal spot. In order to answer 
the first simple question of this inquiry, the direct declarations of the Prime Minister 
would suffice. However, one of the intriguing and interesting characteristics of the 
political behavior of Spain’s former Prime Minister is the fact that he did not project a 
charismatic profile. Instead, he limited his long appearances, and he did not feel 
comfortable addressing masses. He always looked unperturbed but stuffy and rehearsed, 
even when changing his distinctive acute high tone of voice. Political analysts (and many 
PP insiders, who remained fatefully silent) blamed part of the defeat to the adopting of 
the same low profile tactic by his successor and would be Prime Minister, Mariano 
Rajoy.     
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Bibliographical researchers may find themselves frustrated by the fact that 
Aznar’s own intellectual production has been limited. Although a handful of works bear 
his name as author, some are collective books and editions. His most distinctive book was 
published before he was elected Prime Minister in 1996. Most of the books on his career 
have been written by journalists. Some have high humorous tones. One is authored by 
rival politicians (Joaquín Almunia and Iñaki Anasagasti) and two by historian Javier 
Tusell.
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Hence, readers would have had to wait for well after his current retirement from 
active politics, to receive long, solid, reasoned explanations for his policies.
14 Finding the 
answer for the simple question about his motivations for his controversial decision 
inserted in his writings was a futile task, often reduced to one-liners. As a result of his 
painful retirement, a colorful and positive documentary legacy is in doubt, making the 
availability of further interpretations virtually impossible. Nonetheless, his limited public 
appearances, especially in the United States, have offered confirmation of well known 
facts and perceptions, and rather few novelties.     
Moreover, conservative foreign observers (Robert Kagan, among others) and 
Spanish supporters of Aznar’s general policies have pointed out that the crucial and 
detailed motivations for taking a pro-Bush attitude, while considered to be rightly based 
and just, were not rationally and effectively explained. With much regret, they discovered 
that when Aznar ventured beyond the basic issues and justifications, he failed to fully 
anchor the national interest with the specific topic of Spain’s military involvement in 
Iraq. Some of the most lamentable cases were the arguments based on the presence of 
Hispanics in the United States and the details of economic rewards for Spain. According 
to these critical voices, his weakest line of defense was the specific non-evidence of the 
existence of weapons of mass destruction. All this explains his periodic retrenchment to 
generalizing issues and policies, or straight argumentation of vague principles and grand 
strategy.     
Perhaps all this overall assessment is a coherent result emanating from an old-
fashioned conservative conviction and therefore not subject to a public test. Dogma does 
not deserve to be treated in a market of ideas. As a consequence, there is a need for 
deciphering the enigma in the writings and interpretations given by some of the most 
knowledgeable sources. This vaguely detected trend was destined to be painfully evident 
in the dramatic hours after the Madrid March 11 attacks, when Aznar stubbornly stuck to 
the thesis of ETA’s authorship, even when sharing partial evidence to the contrary with 
media editors –he even stressed his personal conviction over the arguments presented by 
Spain’s intelligence services.  
Some observers wrongly thought that they would have the first opportunity to 
obtain a cohesive and fully detailed explanation by enrolling in one of the seminars 
scheduled to be delivered by the former prime minister at Georgetown University during 
the academic year 2004-05, as visiting “scholar” at the School of Foreign Service. 
Unfortunately, the content of his speeches have been a capsule of his well known views 
and historical misinterpretations. Above all, Aznar violated one of the standard protocol 
principles of former prime ministers (and most especially presidents of the United States) 
                                                 
13 See appendix (Aznar Books). 
14 For a review of his views before coming to power, see España: La segunda transición  (Madrid: Espasa-
Calpe, 1994).    
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of limiting criticism of the current government in a proper setting, either in Congress, or 
from other mechanisms in the opposition, but never from a foreign country and even less 
in an educational and scholarly setting. Even worse, this strategy was executed in the 
shadows of the White House, in the even of the U.S. reelection campaign and 
immediately following Bush victory.          
               
Patterns in the press 
 
A review of press commentaries, analysis and opinions issued in Spain on the policy of 
the government regarding the war in Iraq reveals some basic facts. Most outstanding is 
the overwhelming critical nature of the corpus. The number of negative articles not only 
was superior to the scant proportion of commentaries favorable to Aznar, but it also 
approached the percentages of popular opposition to the war. Any experiment of 
computing the number of negative articles and commentaries in comparison with the 
positive evaluations and staunch backing will reveal a ratio of 25-1 (or even higher), a 
proportion that surpasses by far the percentage of public opinion opposed to the war and 
to Spanish involvement in Iraq. Elite opinion, with notable exceptions heavily anchored 
in certain publications, was overwhelmingly negative toward Aznar’s Iraq decision.
15 
Analyzed a little closer, the daily press and the weekly magazines of mostly 
political content present an impressively negative panorama for the theses of the Spanish 
government. Only one newspaper with national readership (ABC) and some sections of 
one weekly (Epoca) may constitute a positive counter balance, endorsing the reasoning of 
Aznar. Even newspapers of centrist tradition, if not conservative in either political or 
economic issues (if not both), as the notorious case of La Vanguardia of Barcelona, 
present a harsh view. The business press (especially Expansión and Cinco Días) could not 
hide opinion-oriented analysis with negative overtones.   
This general impression was noticeable not only in the wide range of signed 
opinion articles (which in number and length published in each issue is comparatively 
important in its genre), but it is perceptible in the content of editorials. While leading 
columnists and editorials of ABC responded to a well-defined line of support for Aznar’s 
policies, a number of opinion articles are moderately critical. Some ABC standing 
columnists (i.e. José Manuel de Prada) were sporadically opposed to some specific 
dimensions of the Spanish endorsement of the U.S. overall policy in Iraq, while others 
(Darío Valcárcel, who as the editor of Política Exterior, the prestigious clone of Foreign 
Affairs, became the protagonist of one of the most surprisingly harsh critical voices) were 
systematically negative of the U.S. strategy.  
Observed as a whole, the fact that many leading political figures engaged in a race 
to meet an apparent obligation of writing and publishing an analysis or op-ed piece on the 
preparations for the war, its development, or especially the activity of the Spanish 
                                                 
15 Although a systematic review of all the media production (selectively limited to op-ed pieces and news 
items published in the national press and a handful of weekly magazines) could be a costly enterprise, a 
scientifically accurate sample of the daily scanning has been made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
spokesperson office, the Diplomatic Information Office (OID). Professionally done, with no bias or attempt 
to hide negative articles even on the internal affairs of the ministry, this “Prensa de la Mañana” and the 
parallel monitoring of the weekly magazines are an accurate mirror of the overall public relations reflection 
of a disastrous policy, from a strictly media angle.                
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government, is very significant. This stunning evidence shows a decision to have within 
reach a precise timely register of personal (more than institutional) attitudes on an event 
considered of a historical magnitude. Few elected to comfortably avoid this difficult task. 
On the contrary, most seemed to have done it very gladly, fearing to lose a golden 
opportunity to distance themselves from a government that they had backed in certain, 
important political periods. Some samples signed by active leading politicians that 
normally are prudent in matters of foreign policy, seemed to be surprising, such as the 
notorious case of Catalan president Jordi Pujol. However, this attitude was coherent with 
the general policy of the Catalan conservative nationalists of Convergència and its partner 
in coalition Unió Democràtica, who bankrolled the PP congressional majority with their 
votes in the first mandate of 1996 to 2000. 
Other interested contributors included politicians of conservative or liberal 
inclinations (in the European sense), as is the case of José Antonio Segurado (founder of 
the Liberal Party and former leader of the Employers Organization), show a definite 
critical stance towards the war and Aznar’s policies. Of the past presidents, only Adolfo 
Suárez (matching his muteness since his retirement) remained silent. While the PSOE’s 
former leader Felipe González has been publishing regular columns in the Spanish and 
international press, and many dedicated to the lambasting of Aznar’s policies, Unión de 
Centro Democrático (UCD)’s brief president Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo reappeared on the 
scene with an unconditional support for Aznar. Joaquín Almunia (named by the new 
Spanish government to substitute for Pedro Solbes, new Minister of the Economy, as 
Commissioner), the PSOE predecessor to Rodríguez Zapatero as candidate for election 
against Aznar, had been publishing regular columns, especially in the Barcelona daily, La 
Vanguardia, with a focus on dismantling Aznar’s justification for the Iraq decision, and 
authored a whole book evaluating very harshly the legacy of PP leader. Former EU 
Commissioner Manuel Marín, the spokesman of the PSOE in the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of Congress, named by Rodríguez Zapatero to be the next President of the 
Spanish parliament, was also publishing weekly articles in Cinco Días, most of them 
dedicated to critically commenting on Aznar’s foreign policy, with clear sentiments 
against the U.S. involvement in Iraq.                  
Intriguing and significant dimensions of these commentaries was the tone used, 
the sharp profile of the language employed, and the absence of an intention to hide clear 
opinions behind an obscure language sporting some pretentious objectivity. Taking sides 
on the Iraq crisis, the policy of the United States, and the Spanish support for Bush was 
the trend, resulting in the clarity of expressions. 
Although limited in number, there were samples of incisive analyses made by 
professional journalists who tried to select a few specific motivations of Aznar’s policy 
and venture some possible gains to obtain for his backing of Bush’s strategy. In this type 
of article, traditional objectivity used in investigative pieces is subtly mixed with an 
irresistible dose of opinion. In general, these incisive pieces, focusing on the reasons (the 
word razones is explicitly used in titles) for Aznar to make that decision, coincide with 
most of the critical analyses as well as with the central justifications offered by the theses 
of his backers. While personal convictions taken without much study (something denied 
by Aznar’s defenders) and some expected gains are mentioned in some of the critical 
outlines, generally favorable analysts are inclined to the standard explanation of the  
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identification of Iraq as terrorist threat, a fact that converted the alliance with the United 
States in a must-do policy in the fight against the standing ETA terrorist challenge. 
Venturing beyond the points of coincidence with the explicitly proposed reasons 
by Aznar, critics then pointed hidden causes and expectations, some concrete gains as a 
reward for taking such a considerable risk. According to this consensus, in a world of 
dangerous confusion, Aznar opted for siding (some use harsher expressions, as 
“subservience”) with the expected winner, especially in a war that was predicted to be 
short, with few issues pending before the May 2003 local Spanish elections. Other 
hidden, or not well explained reasons, mentioned were an expected backing of the United 
States in a possible future crisis with Morocco, Spain as a new venue for a future 
conference on the Middle East, and an increase in aid to Latin America. Some very 
perceptive analysts interpreted Aznar’s serious risk-taking as his calculation that the war 
was preventable by the heavy pressure imposed by the international community on 
Saddam Hussein or by the collapse of the Iraqi regime by internal treason. As a last hope, 
Aznar placed his bet on a fast resolution of the war itself. 
A composite analysis of the pre-war picture involving Spain’s prime minister’s 
attitude and options include some facts and speculation shared by many observers with an 
inside knowledge. First, there was the conviction by the United States that the pressure 
exerted on allies would extract a positive backing from the Security Council for an 
authorization for a war action. This was designed in the expectation that Iraq would cave 
in and authorize the full implementation of the inspection. UK Prime Minister Tony Blair 
had the conviction of obtaining a possible resolution and as a consequence would receive 
the credit. Aznar was always at the mercy of both real protagonists. He finally was placed 
in the impossible situation of obtaining the backing of the Latin American members of 
the Security Council. He was out staged by the French diplomacy in gathering the non-
commitment for the war efforts from the African representatives. The split in the Security 
Council was not only obvious but it was very negative for the U.S. interests. With the 
attack and invasion already decided by Bush, Aznar elected (he had no other choice) to 
bet on a fast resolution of the war itself.      
Significantly, it has to be stressed once more, the clarity of the simplistic analysis 
made by the Spanish government contrasts with the limitation of the arguments used by 
Aznar to justify the overall strategic alliance with the United States, beyond the succinct 
generalizations reduced to the fight against terrorism and hence his support for Bush. 
 
Foreign policy think tanks and publications 
 
In contrast with the United States and some leading European countries, Spain does not 
have a long tradition of professional work on foreign policy produced by institutes and 
think tanks, a rara avis in the social and academic scene, mainly for combinations of 
reasons of lack of a policy of philanthropy and a distrust of government for independent 
thinking. Even less important is the tradition of foreign policy planning designed by the 
same think tanks (sometimes populated by opposition parties) and later executed by the 
government. Although a handful of academic journals are dedicated to diverse angles of 
international profile, they have been traditionally busy with regions that are, for some 
reason or another, a priority of academic research that needs a necessary time lag to 
obtain a minimum perspective. While Latin America, the European Union and, to a lesser  
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extent, the North African region have been the object of this type of academic analytical 
research, the field of international relations at large, and the United States foreign policy, 
have surprisingly seldom been the specific object of serious analysis. In contrast with the 
overwhelming impact of U.S. foreign policy on the evolution of contemporary Spain’s 
situation in the world, from the defeat of 1998 to the Iraq crisis, including the strategic 
alliance of Franco with Washington for the establishment of the military bases in the 
1950s, the think tank and academic scenario does not reveal the existence of a single 
institute, publication, or academic program fully dedicated to the United States (with the 
exception of one with a sociological profile sponsored by the University of Alcalá de 
Henares). 
It is not then surprising that a historical decision of epochal proportions as the one 
made by Aznar was not initially received by an expected volume of in-depth analysis in 
the form of policy papers and evaluating monographs, beyond and above the space-
limited analysis provided in the press by academic personalities. Although its importance 
may be limited, the fact that most research centers depend heavily on government 
subsidies, a highly controversial issue became rather muffled and a risky ground for 
exploration. 
In any event, the result of this scarcity is that studies of the issue dealt with in this 
monograph (on the events before and after the dramatic changes of March 2004) will 
have to heavily concentrate on the output of one prestigious foreign policy publication 
and one think tank institute, both located in Madrid, and coincidentally a few yards away 
from the new site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
16 One is the recently founded Real 
Instituto Elcano and the second is the bi-monthly publication Política Exterior, one of the 
most prestigious foreign policy journals in the best tradition of Foreign Affairs, having 
captured that national spot along its clones in different European countries, with 
followers in the Middle East, Asia and Latin America.        
Both institutions may be considered as part of the establishment with an 
inclination that can safely be branded as conservative (in the case of Elcano, especially 
before the change of government) and center-liberal (as in the case of Política Exterior). 
While the content of Elcano analysis, during the Aznar administration, only sporadically 
included extreme critical analysis of the Spanish and the U.S. foreign policy, Política 
Exterior has been noted for a wider array of views that has tilted towards an open 
negative perception of the Spanish-U.S. alliance and policy in Iraq in the period of 2002-
2004. This is surprising (and shocking for some conservative observers that feel 
betrayed) considering the fact that Política Exterior
17 was born out of the ABC 
establishment, and had been led since its foundation by a leading and well-established 
columnist (and at one point op-ed editor) Darío Valcárcel, whose views in domestic 
policies clash with the PSOE and leftist attitudes. 
The Elcano web content and its periodic print analyses present a coherent and 
steady volume of studies and commentaries that can be interpreted (as a whole, with 
sporadic, notable exceptions) as justifying the Aznar government’s foreign policies, while 
still offering some bases for improvement. In essence, sometimes, some papers available 
during the Aznar administration may be read as a substitute for the absence of explicit 
                                                 
16 The site has turnout to be temporary, because it will have to be vacated due to structural problems. 
17 It eventually moved to another location.   
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and concrete justifications and explanations for the polemic decisions taken by Aznar 
with regard to his alliance with Bush and in his activity within the EU. This trend, 
objectively perceived or the product of a slanted view, prompted members of the Socialist 
opposition to present protests. However, as a whole, the general output of Elcano before 
the events of March 2003 is a must-do stop (for historical reasons, after March 2003) for 
any observer who wants to have a panoramic view of the issues confronted by Spain in 
the world scene. It was expected that the sudden political change as a result of the 
elections of March 14 would have an impact on the content and scope of the line of 
research. Overall, the institution, with a few changes in its analytical management, has 
succeeded in offering a wide array of views and opinion that reflects a well balanced 
mirror or Spanish elite production in foreign affairs as well as incorporating contributions 
from abroad.           
The case of Política Exterior offers an opportunity for meditation on an enterprise 
that reflects an anguish for predicting and interpreting a fast pace of unresolved situations 
that are overcome by events, some of them as surprising and dramatic as the early failure 
of the approval of the EU Constitution. However, Aznar’s motivations and an evaluation 
of the consequences of his actions are barely latent. It was expected that in the rest of 
2004, with the needed perspective of the fiasco caused by the collapse of the EU 
Constitution, attributed to the stubborn resistance of Aznar, the journal would reveal and 
explain part of the enigmas. Depending on the degree of difficulties encountered by the 
U.S. occupation of Iraq, an overall assessment of the U.S. strategy was expected to 
become more evident in subsequent issues, as it was developed in a one-of-a-kind book 
jointly authored by Valcárcel and Spanish diplomat Carlos Alonso Zaldívar (later named 
Spain’s ambassador to Cuba) in the form of an extended interview while the United 
States was readying for war. However, unanswered questions remain, not to be faulted to 
Política Exterior incapacity, but to the fact that Aznar’s motivations were and are 
basically grounded on personal conviction.                                                                          
 
Books 
 
The Spanish publishing scene as a result of September 11 experienced a noticeable 
increase in the number of books dedicated to the pressing issue of international terrorism. 
Books of commentary on the tragedy hit the shelves in 2002, while new titles on the 
Middle East, and especially Iraq captured the attention of readers in 2003. Too soon to 
analyze the specific Spanish position on the war and its consequences, readers only have 
a handful of titles dealing, from a variety of angles, with the foreign policy of the United 
States. In spite of the fact that on September 25, 2003, Spain and the United States 
commemorated the 25
th anniversary of the military agreement of 1953, the scant 
references in the press were a faithful reflection of the non-existent treatment in the form 
of books, with the notable exception of a volume by Angel Viñas, previously the author 
of a classic in the genre. The exception to this absence of titles directly treating the recent 
relationship between the Spanish government and the United States is a book authored by 
Carlos Elordi, El amigo americano.   
Researchers on the motivations of the Spanish government in its alliance with the 
United States over Iraq had to wait for the inclusion of this topic in the handful of books 
published in the context of the 2004 elections. However, it was expected that the bulk of  
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the commentary was reserved to domestic policies as an evaluation of the eight years in 
power. The negative and critical approach of many of these books will undoubtedly be 
replicated by others that may appear to explain the debacle of the PP in the elections.                                       
  
Bands and sectors  
 
First, in a highly politicized and controversial subject such as Spain’s role in the Iraq 
conflict, it was expected that, in spite of the perceived professionalism and objectivity 
(and, above all, honesty) of an impressive overwhelming majority of the personalities 
who accepted to be interviewed for this study), a sort of political bipolarity would result. 
The range of interpretations for the three main topics (motivations and aims of Aznar, 
Spain’s current status in the EU, and the debate over the permanent/provisional condition 
of the confrontation and attitudes towards the United States) oscillated towards two main 
ideological poles.  
One sector could be easily identified as government officials and media leaders 
with inclinations or party affiliations with the Partido Popular of Prime Minister José 
María Aznar. The others can tentatively be described as “the rest”. Labeling this non-PP 
sector as Center-Left would be misleading because the controversy has grouped in one 
team such ideologically diverse political circles as the Socialists, the United Left 
(“reformed” Communists), the liberal-centrist Catalan nationalists, and other 
conservatives and liberals (in the European tradition) who do not respond to the 
guidelines of Aznar’s ideological framework. This sector reflects the range of critical 
opinions exposed in op-ed pieces, as discussed above. Significantly, this “coalition of the 
willing” (adopting the U.S. government term to describe the limited number of countries 
actively siding with President Bush on Iraq’s war) was instrumental in forging the final 
vote that ousted the PP from power.      
 
Personal interviews 
 
One of the most difficult, rewarding and partially revealing experiences of this research 
has been the part based on selective personal interviews undertaken with the generosity 
of approximately forty high level government officials, leading columnists and editors, 
and officers of international organizations, as well as informal conversations with an 
array of academics. The interviews were carried out either in a non-structured manner, or 
by asking three pointed questions: a ranking of three of Aznar’s motivations of 
justifications, an evaluation of the current status of Spain in the world scene and in the 
EU, and an assessment regarding the permanency or temporary nature of the 
confrontation (in terms of transatlantic relations, the EU, and in the Spanish national 
setting) as closely related to the personalities or responding to a deeper cultural clash. 
  At all times, with very few exceptions, respondents seemed to have very clear 
answers for all questions. Predictably, while pro-Aznar officials and backers selected his 
personal conviction of doing the right thing based on the need for a solid alliance to fight 
terrorism, opponents preferred to rank “his own ego” (term used in most cases) and 
ideological affinity with Bush as main reasons and justifications. Concrete motivations 
and expectations of gains varied, with the pro-Aznar sector seldom admitting potential  
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specific economic rewards, preferring to point out the benefits in the fight against the 
ETA threat. 
  To be subsumed in the collective assessment about the prevailing perception of 
Spain’s power in the world and especially the EU, the bulk of the opinion of a 
representation of the think-tank community and diplomatic establishment in Brussels was 
either guarded, skeptical or negative regarding the future leverage enjoyed by Spain as a 
result of its alliance with the United States. This general feeling became more acute in 
view of the failure to agree on the draft of the EU Constitution. Results of urgent and 
selected consultations made after the March elections defeat revealed a feeling of relief 
for “getting rid” (explicit term used) of a rather uncomfortable partner.    
    
Trends and style 
 
In answering the first pivotal question of deciphering Aznar’s motivations, two groups of 
explanations raised to the surface. On the opposing side, personal convictions with some 
ideological touches dominated the scene, while in the conservative PP band, explanations 
concentrated around world strategic arguments and the need to face the terrorist threats. 
Surprisingly for some minority observers, strictly personal motivations and economic 
gains (bordering corruption) were universally absent in all explanations given. Isolated 
opinions pointed to hidden motivations toward possible future employment in the private 
sector (and academia, including positions in the United States), in addition to the 
customary expectations of high-level positions in international organizations such as the 
UN. Personal vanity occupied, in a stunning and unanimous manner, most of the priority 
spots targeted by the opposition when trying to explain Aznar’s motivations. This 
identification significantly matched a preference of his backers for stressing personal 
integrity motivations and convictions, something that political opponents and many 
neutral observers equalized to an ideological leaning closer to the ideas professed by 
George Bush and his associates.  
In the context of the electoral defeat, commentaries centered on some emblematic 
passages of Aznar’s experience in his alliance with Bush. Among the favorite reminders 
was the historical photo opportunity of the Azores, framed in the company of UK Prime 
Minister Tony Blair. In view of the electoral defeat, this picture has been estimated by 
political experts to be Aznar’s most expensive photograph of his career.
18 Months later, 
Aznar boasted of being in such company, in comparison to other pictures where leaders 
are framed by Castro and Venezuelan Chávez. 
  In both bands and in the opinions of centered observers, harsh and foul language 
is seldom used when referring to either Aznar’s inclinations or the actions of the political 
opposition. While the tone of the op-ed pieces was blunt (a feature that became harsher 
with his defeat) and direct, and speeches in Congress might have been sarcastic and rich 
in metaphors, including invitations to resign and some references to “shame” and 
“decency”, a sort of mutual respect was minimally maintained. As expected, when Aznar 
chose a much harsher tone in denouncing the new foreign policy of Zapatero, especially 
while traveling in the United States, the press was merciless to him. In the expressions 
used in private interviews, only isolated cases of government officials, for example, used 
                                                 
18 Ironically, its author was awarded a coveted prize given by the prestigious El País in consideration of its 
intrinsic news and artistic values.  
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long-time gone labels such as “communists” for referring to demonstrators against the 
war. Opponents never crossed the delicate line of venturing into the terrain of personal or 
family details.              
In sum, the answers emanating from the government-inclined sector were more 
precise, limited to a few topics. In contrast, the opposition seemed to be richer in 
speculation, opening grounds for further investigation, although this pattern does not 
mean that the results shed a more refined light on explaining the central enigmas. 
  On the extreme spatial sidelines of interpretations, one taking into account the 
foreign dimension and the other venturing into the exclusive domestic arena, two 
complementary issues captured the top spots in the analysis and opinions given by a 
surprising number of (for some tastes, unguarded) observers. Accepting that all politics 
are local, in Aznar’s mind the threat against Spain’s political unity is intimately linked to 
the global terrorist threat. Therefore, his personal experience miraculously escaping a 
death attempt by ETA in 1995 led to his uncompromising fight against this scourge. 
Hence, his opportune decision in seeking to end the Spanish domestic problem with his 
alliance with Bush’s global strategy after September 11. In a rather coherent way, his 
stubborn advocating for the ETA’s origin of the March 11 attacks makes a lot of sense. 
Nonetheless, as pointed out above, his insistence on this thesis, when contrary evidence 
was revealed, contributed to his fall.  
  In the foreign scenario, an apparently insignificant incident seemed to be chosen 
by numerous observers and leaders (in both political camps) as one of the dominant 
reasons for Aznar’s decision to set his lot with President Bush’s strategy: Perejil. 
According to this interpretation, the feeling of isolation and disdain by other European 
colleagues felt by the Spanish during the crisis, and the fact that Aznar had to rely on the 
mediating services of U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, convinced the Spanish 
premier of the necessity of siding with Washington in a highly uncertain global situation.                       
  Regarding the status of Spain’s position in the EU as a result of the controversial 
decision, the bands were irreconcilable. For the opposition, Spain was in a sorry worse 
shape in Europe than before September 11 and his siding with Bush, while Aznar’s 
backers vouch that Spanish influence has been reinforced. This “consensus”, or agreeing 
to disagree, seemed to be broken when dealing with the third question, especially when 
entering a shaky terrain such as Spain’s attitude towards the United States. Surprisingly, 
some Popular Party observers agreed with the opposition in considering the confrontation 
over the role of the United States as opportunistic and electorally-linked. While some on 
the right thought that anti-U.S. sentiments in conservative circles had disappeared, some 
think they still survive. While some in the opposition thought that the controversy had 
solidified an innate anti-U.S. feeling in Spain, some considered (and still do, without any 
doubt) the trend intrinsically connected to the personalities of Bush and Aznar. Most 
optimists in the opposition band were hoping for a better future climate, whishing that 
any of the possible successors of Aznar (later to be confirmed as Mariano Rajoy) would 
seek a better accommodation with the opposition and would try to reestablish Spain’s 
role in Europe. If President Bush were out of the picture in Washington in 2005, this 
same sector of observers predicts that anti-U.S. feelings would had been reduced in 
Europe in general and especially in Spain.          
  Polarization best describes the resulting cleavage of opinions. However, while 
these were no exceptions to the rule of solid backing and standard explanations given by  
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most government officials and most PP-leaning political leaders, the media traditionally 
considered as conservative or “liberal” (in the European sense) often included critical 
commentaries on Aznar’s policies, and especially on the strategy of the United States in 
the aftermath of the Iraqi war. In sum, off-the-record comments given by government 
officials (with very few exceptions on specific items) mirrored the panorama offered by 
the PP representatives in Congress.  
This expected result partially explains the reverberations of the controversial 
explanations given by Spain’s ambassador to the UN, Inocencio Arias. Accurately 
interpreted as a critical assessment of the overall U.S. policy, and hence of Spain’s role in 
the Iraqi crisis, his opinions caused a tremor in media and political circles especially 
when the Spanish envoy was ordered to return to New York when he was apparently at 
the beginning of his August 2003 customary summer vacation. Ironically, in what was 
one of his last active appearances at the UN, Arias had to carry out orders from his 
superiors advocating for ETA’s authorship of the attacks and forcing a vote from his 
colleagues, a move that was received with much opposition and resentment. He later 
officially apologized to his colleagues for misleading them.      
The controversial episode of Arias' end of vacationing was seen as the tip of the 
iceberg of an open secret confrontational and low morale environment in the depths of 
the Spanish diplomatic service. Not necessarily identifiable as inclined to Socialist and 
liberal ideological preferences, a substantial number of Spanish Foreign Service officers 
have been extremely critical of the course taken by the government regarding the post-
September 11 strategies. This atmosphere is attributed not only to political 
disagreements, but also to corporate tensions, feelings of isolation and irrelevancy while 
major decisions are crafted within the Prime Minister’s entourage. Moreover, this 
uncomfortable state was perceived as to be generated by what was described by even PP 
insiders as an erratic management style of Foreign Minister Ana Palacio, considered to be 
the most confrontational and morale-wracking in recent history.                 
  As in the case of public opinion, as demonstrated by the spectacular number of 
people attending demonstrations against the war and protesting for Spain’s policy, media 
and elite attitudes reflect a much wider political spectrum than the usual center-left and 
center-right which is the current trend as seen in recent elections. Spanish opposition to 
the U.S. policy and Spain’s involvement in the Iraq crisis was much wider than the close 
to 50% of the electorate who voted for leftist or centrist alternatives in the municipal and 
autonomous elections of May 2003. Added to this sector, a substantial number of centrist, 
and even conservative, columnists and media leaders were extremely critical of the war 
projects, were apprehensive during the brief conflict, and have been increasingly 
skeptical and openly negative on the U.S. occupation strategy. They have been, as a 
result, concerned for the involvement of Spanish troops in a new mission that has been 
seen in a different light than the previous military or police experiences in diverse 
scenarios such as the former Yugoslavia, Central America, and even Afghanistan. 
            
Reasons 
 
Reduced to its minimum expression, Aznar’s decision to back Bush’s policy was simple 
and clear. It was a matter of choice for identifying and paralleling the strategy of the 
United States, criminally attacked by the terrorists of Al Queda on September 11, with  
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the particular ongoing threat of the ETA terrorists in Spain. In consequence, the logic to 
be followed was the unconditional antiterrorist cooperation, resulting in the support for 
Washington’s initiatives. 
Once the campaign in Afghanistan was implemented and positively supported by 
European governments and citizens, Bush had to face the reality of the evasive nature of 
Bin Laden. As a consequence of this shortcoming, the vague identification of an entity 
called “international terrorism” needed to be individualized and properly located without 
running the risk of losing the limited attention span of the U.S. people, still traumatized 
by the shock of September 11, unable to comprehend the nature of such event and its 
foreign origin. Americans were used to facing concrete enemies (from the affront 
suffered at Pearl Harbor and Hitler’s Germany to the Soviet empire). Refining the shape 
of the “axis of evil”, Iraq was chosen in a trio formed with Iran and North Korea.  
When the response to this identification was skepticism, dry humor and outright 
opposition, Aznar retrenched to reach for a juridical endorsement. The legality of the 
actions of the United States in pointing towards Iraq was sustained by the resolutions of 
the United Nations Security Council regarding the inspections in search for weapons of 
mass destruction, a procedure that Saddam Hussein had opposed for a dozen years. 
In this fashion, in a wide context related to the defense of Spanish interests, 
Aznar’s strategy was justified to insert Spain in the place reserved according to his 
calculations (which did not match the legacy left by the preceding Socialist 
administration). Critics from the opposition and skeptical commentators reminded him, 
on one hand, that Spain had reached notable heights of international leadership and 
respect thanks to a consensus on foreign policy built between the PSOE and the PP since 
the Spanish accession to the EU and the compromise for the consolidation of membership 
in NATO. This consensus was now under grave danger, if not eliminated. 
Moreover, on the strictly domestic front, Aznar pointed out that cooperation 
against international terrorism would be rewarded by U.S. help in appropriate intelligence 
and technology to be applied in tactics against ETA. The opposition responded that 
reinforcement of the relationship with France and other European countries, with respect 
to extradition processes, was more effective in resolving a problem that was essentially 
internal in causes and management. Ironically, when Aznar insisted on ETA’s authorship 
of the March 11 attacks in Madrid, he was not doing a favor to Bush, in view of the 
futility of the alleged U.S. help in confronting the domestic Basque threat.    
Aznar needed an additional, novel explanation for distancing himself from the 
customary interest prevalent in the nucleus of the European Union (mainly led by 
Germany and France), now far removed from the orbit of the United States. Aznar 
reminded observers and critics that Spain had a legacy in the Western Hemisphere (in 
addition to its European vocation) and historical obligations distinct from other European 
nations.  
This dimension was not only sustained through the traditional links with Latin 
America, as expressed though the development of the Ibero-American Community 
project, but also through the presence of Hispanics in the United States. On the occasions 
when this link was presented to justify the strategic alliance with Bush, criticism abound 
from the opposition and objective commentators. From acerbic notations to ironic 
references the result was the opposite of the intention.            
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In sum, when Aznar opted to utter explanations beyond the standard justification 
of the fight against international terrorism and its identification with ETA, the result was 
negative in communication. At the end of the year 2003, with the failed EU constitutional 
process, Spain apparently had returned to the initial departing point. The use of concrete 
reasoning was abandoned, with Congress ready to be dismissed for new elections in 
March, and the mantle prepared to be passed to his successor.  
 
IV 
 
The Game Plan of Aznar 
 
 
From September 11, 2001, to March 11-14, 2004 
 
With the arrival of 2004, almost eight years had lapsed with Aznar in power. As reviewed 
above, fulfilling his pledge, he was not running for re-election in March, although his 
party was destined by the polls for a repeat of a win, although capturing an absolute 
majority was totally discarded. It was an appropriate time for a review of the important 
events since September 11, 2001, which include the tempestuous developments of 2003 
ending with the failed constitutional project of the EU. Domestically, the imminent call 
for new elections coincided with the celebration of the 25
th anniversary of the Spanish 
Constitution and the resolving of the Catalan autonomic elections, with the formation of a 
tripartite coalition led by the Socialists to oust the incumbent centrist nationalists 
historically led by Jordi Pujol, who retired from active politics.  
In both cases, the pending issues of Spanish democracy became obvious when the 
Catalan coalition promised to obtain an increase in the degree of autonomy, adding 
pressure to the serious challenge posed by the Basque government pointing out towards 
independence. The incident caused by the interview held by Esquerra Republicana’s 
leader Josep Lluis Carod Rovira (who was acting Catalan President, in the absence of 
Pasqual Maragall) with ETA’s representatives, added fuel to the fire of political 
confrontation when the Aznar government accused the Socialists of associating with 
“accomplices” of terrorists. By labeling all Catalans unfaithful to Spanish democracy, the 
PP leadership only accomplished that potential Esquerra backers and other previously 
moderate nationalists catapulted Carod to political stardom. Removed from his position 
as Conseller en Cap (“prime minister”) in the Catalan government, he ran officially for 
the Spanish Congress, and increased the number of seats of his party from a solitary one 
to a spectacular eight.                     
  A review of the eight years of PP administration provides us with a necessary 
macrocontext to refine the analysis of the current pending issues. In this fashion, a 
window of speculation is open on to the future of Spain at the international and the 
European levels. A fast flashback motion beyond 1996 and a prediction for 2005 and the 
years afterwards still permit us to speculate if the present confrontational situation 
(domestically and between certain European powers and the United States) is permanent 
or responds to the conditioning imposed by the personalities that had monopolized the 
scene formed by Spain, the European Union, and the United States. 
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A lineup of motivations, means, and aims 
 
The task of organizing the motivations, justifications, means, and aims of Aznar, since 
his arrival to power, is not easy. Explanations provided by Aznar have not always 
matched those of the analysts and secondary actors. 
Instead of mapping out a series of interpretations in ranking order, a novel way of 
observing the resulting panorama is by laying out the comprehensive results of the 
inquiry, respecting both points of view in a sort of theoretical design as used in sports 
blackboards by coaches. 
The choice of this metaphorical interpretation of a set of motivations, reasons and 
strategies used by Aznar in making and implementing his historical decision may look 
too light and non-academic. It is fully justified by the explicit choice of an expression that 
has the undisputed trademark of Aznar: he wanted Spain to play en la primera división 
(the major leagues, in U.S. terms).
19       
Adaptable to other sports, but avoiding the temptation of regimentally dividing 
the field into two different line ups of defense and offense, a more familiar European and 
Latin American soccer style design may be more appropriate. The proposed framework 
may help to elucidate the motivations and the reasons (explicit or not) for Aznar to take 
the path towards the alliance with Bush, as opposed to siding with the standard EU 
partners of the previous government and the trademark of Spain’s insertion in the EU. 
Conservative but historically traditional, Aznar’s game plan strikes at first sight as pre-
modern soccer, as prevailed in the first third of the 1900s. It looks as it was before 
adopting the first revolutionary change with the English “WM” design positioning of 
three backs, two midfielders, two inside forwards, one center forward, and two wings. 
Aznar was bolder, as in the soccer infancy: one goalie, two backs, three midfielders, and 
five forwards. As we will see later in the game, he was forced to experiment not only 
with the novelty of the Brazilian 4-2-4 that propelled Pelé to stardom, but later by 
adopting the Italian defensive tactics using a “libero” or the prevailing 4-4-2 of present 
times. Let’s explain.  
 
The initial line up will then be the following: 
 
1.  Goal keeping 
2.  Outpacing the PSOE 
3.  Personal conviction  
4.  Confronting international terrorism 
5.  U.S. protection 
6.  Fighting ETA 
7.  Hispanics 
8.  National integrity 
9.  Major league play 
10. EU-France 
11. Economic gains 
                                                 
19 This lexicon (mostly related to soccer) is also standard in the frequent informal talk of politicians and 
media when describing political behavior. Red cards, penalties, goals and other terms are used to substitute 
for legal and procedural expressions.  
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The goalkeeper position represented Spain’s position in 1996 and Aznar’s vision 
of the EU and the world. Considered to be under the weight of the ballast imposed by the 
past legacy of the PSOE, Aznar did not show a special interest in the external dimension. 
Coldly obsessed with capturing power, he did not need a confrontation on the external 
agenda. Strategy was limited to exploiting the domestic weaknesses of Felipe González' 
government besieged by economic difficulties, personal corruption against some of his 
associates, and the logical erosion of power exercised since 1983. Relatively successful in 
the international area, González was hit by a call from Aznar: “It’s the economy and 
corruption, stupid”. The last months in office were spent in an environment dominated by 
an insulting invitation given by Aznar in Congress: “Váyase, Señor González [Leave, Mr. 
González]”. Simultaneously, no special external program was offered. Weeks before the 
March 2004 election, when polls revealed an unnerving close call, some PSOE backers 
were sorry that Aznar was actually not running: “Quédese, Sr. Aznar” [Stay, Mr. Aznar], 
they claimed. Ironically, leaving office and staying out of the elections, he was actually 
framed as the real loser, instead of Rajoy.    
Frugal in declarations, extremely limited in intellectual production, prudent in the 
elaboration of extensive campaign programs, Aznar did not then reveal major spectacular 
divergences with the incumbent regarding the practical placement of Spain in the 
European project or the world at large. Differences were reduced to a vague denunciation 
of the relative shortcoming of the Spanish economy compared with some of the major 
European powers. While he reinforced the customary endorsement of the Latin American 
legacy of Spain, Aznar’s declarations filtered out a certain degree of skepticism for the 
deepening of European integration, a feeling not well detected then that later would be 
confirmed with the events of 2003. 
 
Defense and midfielders 
 
With the objective of ameliorating the solitude of the goalie (his only argument), Aznar 
placed in front two formidable reasons, as old-fashioned backs. While one part of the 
strategy was well publicized and admitted, the other became obvious to his opponents 
and keen observers. One was self-centered and based on his own trust in his personal 
possibilities. The second was anchored on a view over his shoulder, with a focus on the 
past. 
On his right he used personal intuition and a protagonist role, with no apparent 
limitations. He studied alternatives but made decisions assisted only by a small circle of 
assistants working in the Moncloa Palace, the residence of the Prime Minister and office 
complex. In the fashion of modern side defense players, this strategy/player was ready to 
run forward along the sideline, infiltrating the enemy’s defenses. This line of thought 
became more acute when he made the decision to not run for reelection. Shedding the 
weight imposed by prudence and calculation on the number of votes needed, he felt free 
to take bolder and riskier options. This was his undoing, according to a generalized 
assessment, propelling him to maintain his views until the last minute when he 
confronted the uncomfortable feeling of Islamic fundamentalism of the Madrid terrorist 
attacks. His personal calls to editors stressing his personal conviction were a trade mark 
of past behavior.          
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On his left, as a very negative factor, he stressed the need to distance himself from 
the policies of the PSOE. This decision forced him to seek any excuse to obtain a mark of 
difference from the characteristics of the foreign policy of Felipe González, at any price, 
even though they were part of a generally well-structured consensus that has its roots in 
the consolidation of a master plan crafted by the defunct UCD of Adolfo Suárez. Both 
side backs (personal conviction and distance from PSOE) had been impelled by a feeling 
of acting on their own, claiming not to have any debts with any other interest than the 
legitimacy of democratic victory in 1996 and 2000, especially the absolute majority in his 
last mandate. Endorsement from the Catalan Convergència i Unió (CiU) coalition and 
other minority parties in either obtaining a necessary practical absolute majority or to 
pass certain legislation was used for domestic purposes with no major disagreements in 
the international terrain. 
After September 11, latent since the reelection in 2000 with absolute majority and 
the subsequent crisis of leadership suffered by the PSOE, Aznar armored himself with 
three more mechanisms, a powerful midfield line (repositioned, as we will later see, in 
moments of pressure) to give him a warranty and to be used as decisive weapons when he 
made the historic decision. This line was composed of an old-fashioned center midfielder 
personified by the United States –better said, by George W. Bush. He was accompanied 
by a pair of “half wings” represented on the right by the response against international 
terrorism and on the left a twin policy of confronting the criminal activity of the Basques. 
Depending on the circumstances, the center midfielder played as a more modern 
center back, and at times as a last resort libero designed by defense oriented Italian 
calcio. Meanwhile, the two wings dedicated to the fight against terrorism were converted 
as a dual “pivot”, as a maximum justification for all polemic decisions. The back line was 
then composed of five players as used by modest teams today. By linking Al Queda 
terrorist activity with an alleged Iraqi connection, policy was justified by the threat posed 
by the Basque problem. 
In this item, Aznar’s traumatic experience escaping by miracle a bombing attempt 
made on him just before coming to power was considered as central in targeting this 
scourge as a primary objective of his strategy. Personal scars fused with his 
uncompromising conception about the unity of Spain, in danger not only by terrorist 
separatist aims and actions of ETA, but by other independence-seeking projects laid out 
by the governing Basque Nationalist Party (PNV).
20  
Although in principle these two “points” were creative in nature, they were 
progressively reformed into performing destructive tasks, ready to neutralize opponents 
accusing them of aiding or abetting terrorists. That was the Spanish variance of “to be 
with us or against us” doctrine issued by Bush. While sometimes the tactic that was 
followed was reduced to slow down the tempo of the game, at no time was the public 
managing to question the overall strategy because no one wanted to be caught in the 
collaborationist band, be it international or domestic. When Aznar crossed a delicate line, 
as when he ventured that the opposition was waiting to rejoice with the arrival of the first 
coffins filled with the bodies of Spanish soldiers from Iraq, he was directly questioned by 
critics and public opinion. Then, he retrenched to a more prudent position. 
 
 
                                                 
20 For speculation of U.S. support for Spain in the fight against ETA terrorism, see Appendix (País Vasco).   
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The forward line  
 
With the rear guard well-covered, Aznar then designed an ambitious offence, combining 
traditional positions with modern variations. As a symbolic center forward, Aznar needed 
a media attractive star. As a replay of the opening of the soccer market by the Bosman 
decision, Aznar announced his ambition to not only reduce Spain’s dependency on EU 
aid, but to convert the country into a major international actor. Aznar wanted Spain to 
play, in his own words, en primera división, in the major leagues in U.S. terms. 
Moreover, a national first division was not enough –Spain deserved to be constantly 
competing not only in the Champions League, but in a World Series, in the real soccer 
sense of the World Cup. Of course, he felt uncomfortable playing in a UEFA cup for 
second stringers, nowadays reduced to a consolation prize. 
  As strengthening of the electoral scenario, this was the missing dimension to 
attract the attention of a sector of the middle class and conservatives who had nostalgic 
feelings of past imperial glories, not feeling comfortable in the confusing and competitive 
European scenario, dominated by the EU establishment, to which Aznar never felt a 
sense of belonging. Scant but blunt declarations revealed his intentions illustrated in 
popular Spanish expressions of warning, disdain, and arrogant attitudes. “They are going 
to get used to seeing Spain at the head table”, was a frequent admonition translated as 
“They will see; we’ll teach them a lesson”.     
  On the sides of this traditional forward line, Aznar placed two proposals, 
alternating their positions, crisscrossing the lightning moves of the center forward. On the 
right, he placed a safe, but ambitious business-oriented attitude, anchored on recent bold 
foreign investment (actually initiated by the Socialists) in Latin America (branded as a 
new Reconquista) aiming at benefiting from reconstruction contracts in Iraq. On the left, 
the winger seemed to look like the traditional inclination for the Latin American region, 
but it was heavily stressed to justify the apparent estrangement from the European scene. 
This player was to be more spectacular than in the past, bolder than the old-fashion 
affinity for the Latin American countries, the staple of all governments since the defeat of 
98. Replicating the audacity of Spanish investment in the backyard of the United States, 
Aznar surprisingly offered a novel justification for siding with the United States in the 
war in Iraq and rejecting the opposition of most of his partners in Europe and the feeling 
of the majority of Spain’s public opinion.  
  In a series of interviews, declarations and blunt announcements, Aznar 
acknowledged the presence of about 40 million Hispanics in the United States as an 
obligation for Spain to back Bush’s strategy in Iraq. It is not clear by the statements made 
and the interpretations offered by the media if Aznar was engaging in a policy of 
obtaining the Hispanic endorsement for his alliance with Bush, or was actually designing 
a campaign strategy to capture part of their vote needed for the reelection in key electoral 
states.
21 In any event, this novel player was up for grabs, free from transfer fees. He has 
been supplied by the pull immigration factor of the United States, and the push force of 
poverty and underdevelopment in Latin America. It is ironic that Aznar’s strategy clashed 
with the arguments made by Samuel Huntington in his new controversial article and book 
opposing Hispanic immigration in starkly racist terms. The Harvard professor only 
                                                 
21 For a review of the commentaries made on Aznar visit to Miami , see Appendix (Miami Visit).    
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needed to add Aznar as an accomplice of the capturing of the United States by Spanish 
speakers.      
This untapped sociological resource was the complement to the investment 
strategy in Latin America, reinforced with the expectation of good business in Iraq, and 
an increase in U.S. investment in Spain, converting the country into a solid beach head of 
U.S. activity in Europe. In reverse, Spain was aiming to substituting France (as suffering 
from the old Europe syndrome) in receiving the attention of Americans.                     
 
Back to the home front 
  
Prudent and distrustful, in spite of his bold and aggressive moves, Aznar kept an eye 
close to the home front in case the opponents would try to launch an attack against the 
rear guard provisionally busy in functions of forward positions. On the one hand, 
retrenching to his original domestic obsessions, Aznar confronted the need to solidify 
internal territorial cohesion. Central in his political thinking, an uncompromising attitude 
towards regional nationalism, be it the moderate demand for increased autonomy in 
Catalonia, or a more radical stance for independence in the Basque Country, Aznar also 
reinforced his justification for a solid line of defense against outside enemies with an 
intolerant attitude in the domestic arena. 
On the other hand, he still had to pay sharp attention to the position of Spain in 
Europe, counting on the support of the considerable power of the EU. Ironically, when 
Aznar was most in need of this support confronting difficulties in the Mediterranean, he 
felt abandoned, and then betrayed. Constantly under the pressure of instability, 
uncontrolled immigration and latent sources of Muslim fundamentalism, Spain was 
encountering a potential crisis.   
Spain’s national identity and European anchoring then deserved the attention of 
two inside forwards in a constructive mode, ready to come to the rescue when the 
homeland was in danger. Under extreme circumstances, these two key players would take 
the positions previously reserved to the double “pivot” (the double fight against 
terrorism), inserted in the middle of the defense.            
While the internal nationalist challenge was barely under control thanks to the 
majority advantage enjoyed by the PP in Congress, and the fact that a notable sector of 
the PSOE has not been traditionally inclined to further experiments in this terrain, the 
existence of a challenge in the South became obvious after September 11. The fact that 
negotiations over the status of Gibraltar did not make the expected progress made the 
future of the relations with Morocco worrisome. The worsening of the relations between 
Madrid and Rabat after the death of Hassan II converted the precarious status of Ceuta 
and Melilla into a hot issue exploding with the crisis over the inlet of Perejil in July 2002.  
The time had arrived for using the inside-midfield player specialized in European 
functions. However, he was missing in a sort of French inaction. In confronting 
Morocco’s brief occupation of Perejil, pondering about the spillover effects of the 
recapture of the small rock, Aznar expected the unconditional endorsement of the EU and 
a warning against Morocco. He got the standard declarations from Brussels but French 
President Chirac did not want to antagonize France’s historical partner in North Africa. 
Aznar took note, saw the irreplaceable need of the U.S. backing, received the decisive 
cooperation of Colin Powell in guaranteeing the return to the status quo, and he gladly  
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got ready to return the favor to Bush. The center midfielder was not only playing in the 
rear back but all over the pitch. 
 With no media puntas (as is the Spanish term for the accompanying guards of the 
solitary center forward), the wingers were left as orphans to play by themselves a twin 
isolated guerrilla warfare in the Americas and in the Middle East. With the defense 
occupied in confronting internal difficulties and unable to function constructively in 
Europe (as the result of the EU Constitution process has shown), the wingers could not 
expect precise ball centering throws from midfielders. Spain’s presence in the Americas 
has returned to the situation of the pre-democracy times, when it was a simple foreign 
policy of substitution, an alternative product for action in a more favorable terrain when 
hostile scenarios (Europe) were banned. The result has been that the solitary center-
forward who thought to be playing in the World Cup, had to struggle to help his team 
clinch to a middle position in the rankings, avoiding at all costs demotion to the second 
division. 
 
V 
Conclusion 
  
The fading 
 
As the Spanish election was approaching and the U.S. electoral season gained strength 
with the Democratic primaries, Aznar executed a U.S. farewell by addressing Congress 
with the satisfaction of his followers and the polite congratulation of the opposition. 
Never mind that his audience was composed of only forty legislators and a handful of 
staffers and interns. He also failed to obtain a scant number of votes for a congressional 
medal that never came into fruition. Press reports and diplomatic leaks revealed that the 
Spanish government led by Aznar had contracted (for a total of US $ 4 million) with a 
Washington DC lobby firm to influence the U.S. Congress in matters of interest for 
Spain. A norm in the case of many foreign governments, the additional problem was that 
among the items billed by the firm attorneys was the drafting of letters of introduction to 
Congress people on the qualifications of Aznar to attend his address and vote positively 
for the award. The Spanish opposition simultaneously grabbed the opportunity to slap 
him for refusing to appear in the Spanish parliament to face the controversy of the 
conflicting or faked reports about the existence of the weapons of mass destruction, while 
Blair was cornered in his own parliament and Bush resorted to blame the CIA.
22 
In this climate the results of the attempt to capture the attention of U.S. Hispanics 
to obtain their endorsement for Spain’s strategy regarding Iraq faded away. Limitations 
of resources to convert the traditional cultural programs into a sort of foreign assistance 
within the United States to encourage the social and economic development of Hispanics 
were in danger of back firing when expectations were raised by the new approach. 
Absence of empirical evidence in delivering an increase of the Hispanic vote for Bush 
would return the novel policy to the traditional dimensions. Seasoned commentators 
warned that, even worse, Aznar’s strategy could be met by the ideological rejection 
formed by traditional inclinations of radical Democrats and the identification of the new 
Spanish insertion as new imperialism. The fact is that the label “Hispanic” is rejected by 
                                                 
22 For press impact, see Appendix (Medal).  
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a notable number of Hispanics who prefer to be called latinos for reasons of alleged 
cultural arrogance pointing towards this direction. These latent difficulties were added to 
recent problems encountered by customary lines of relations with Latin America, as is 
revealed by the lack of focus and efficiency of the Ibero-American Summits, far away 
from the initial enthusiasm when the aim was the foundation of a Community mirroring 
the British Commonwealth. 
On the other side of the ambitious forward line, Spanish investments have 
encountered image problems by identifying them with the internal social, political and 
economic shortcomings of the Latin American republics, especially in the Southern 
Cone. Aznar’s political support for Bush did not help in counteracting the aggressive 
complaints of populist leaders such as Argentina’s Nestor Kirchner. The opposition had 
consistently criticized this negative change for the image of Spain while the meager or 
flatly non-existent economic rewards (only one company in secondary partnership with a 
U.S. conglomerate obtained a small reconstruction contract) for the backing in Iraq have 
not been sufficient to offset the political fallout. This overall panorama was on the radar 
screen of a future PP government without Aznar to revaluate the general strategy, and 
order a retrenchment of the bold moves performed by him while in office. 
  In sum, two isolated figures in his strategy would remain in the pitch: the 
goalkeeper and the center forward, unconvincing past (a mirage created by Aznar) and 
the flashing future (a dream never realized). The goalie would return to be as Aznar 
portrays Spain’s situation in 1996, but he had his vision blocked by an accumulation of 
backs, libero, midfielders converted into defense, and inside forwards lacking a clear 
mission. The star in front was hopelessly left alone waiting for a magic pass. With not too 
much to do in a major league for himself alone, he would have to wait for a transfer to 
pay for the debt incurred from the errors of a policy that turned out to be costly, 
contradictory and inefficient. 
Central to the conclusions of this analysis, before and especially after the March 
2004 debacle, is the evaluation of the impact of the crisis and decisions made by Aznar 
on the relative status of Spain in the European Union. Before the defeat at the booths, it 
was quite obvious that the constitutional disaster of Brussels in December 2003 only 
revealed that Aznar had converted Spain into a partner with a stronger veto power. He not 
only warned of that new fact, but he actually implemented it in a spectacular way. He 
slammed the door and left his one time powerful partners stunned and irritated and the 
EU in disarray. He had fulfilled his threat through the explicit declarations made by his 
faithful diplomats in the last stages of the IGC –Spain was not to agree on the changing 
of the voting procedure from the advantageous position acquired in Nice. 
The cost was almost immediately high. Some concrete decisions made by the EU 
establishment regarding the selection of certain agencies were negative for Spain. First, 
there was the failure for the nomination of the sites for the ITER computer project 
(grabbed by France) and the food administration agency, which had been lobbied for 
Barcelona. Then there was the announcement of the confirmation of the reduction in the 
structural and regional funds with a considerable damaging effect for Spain, but this has 
been expected for a long time and had contributed to a loss of European enthusiasm for 
Aznar’s calculating mind. Europe had ceased to be important, even before the dramatic 
series of events after September 11. Aznar had already planned a strategic shift and found 
it once the world was turned upside down by the Twin Towers attacks.   
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In the event (confirmed by pessimists and realists) that the EU would take a more 
intergovernmental profile after the slowing down of the constitutional project, this would 
have been interpreted as a partial personal triumph of governments, such as Aznar’s, that 
professed that inclination. What was not well explained was the real and empirically 
detectable political benefit for Spain, a country that has at large received the positive 
consequences of a cohesive, supranational posture of the EU institutional framework. In 
this setting, small and medium powers have benefited from increasing international 
power and influence by inserting themselves in the overall impressive economic (and 
political) world power. By enlarging individual blocking power, Spain was on the way to 
losing considerable influence in building a necessary consensus for an efficient and 
credible EU.      
Returning to the soccer analogies, with Spain without a World Cup to play in, 
eliminated in the early rounds of a particular Champions League, rejecting the 
consolation prize of playing the UEFA Cup, the threat of demotion from the league, 
earlier known “of the stars”, forced the new management (the PP without Aznar) to 
meditate on a new course of action. The new situation also would advise the new coach 
(Mariano Rajoy), now on the bench, to look back to the stands and hear what the voting 
fans are shouting. “It’s life in Spain (schools, roads, water, crime, pensions), stupid”. It 
may appear as over stretching the soccer similarities, but coincidental as it may be, the 
end of the PP supremacy happened simultaneously with a series of losses for Real 
Madrid, the preferred team of Aznar. First, the club lost the final of the King’s Cup to 
Real Zaragoza. Then, it was eliminated in the quarter finals of the European Champions 
League. Moreover, Rodríguez Zapatero confessed before the elections that he was a FC 
Barcelona fan. Finally, after losing a series of home matches, Real Madrid ended the 
season on fourth place, outpaced by FC Barcelona and Deportivo. It is no wonder that 
Madrid President linked his team’s downfall to the consequences of the March elections.           
Before the disaster, the PP was hopeful of obtaining a comfortable (although not 
absolute) majority, confirming the trend by which Spanish mature voters know how to 
distinguish between protests on foreign policy and a sound domestic management. This 
scheduled victory after leaving office might have had Aznar convinced of the goodness 
of his decision. With the new political situation after March 14, we would never be able 
to say if the alliance with Bush was good for Spain’s future. But we know of the actual 
cost in European affairs and the collateral effects of the March 11 attacks.  
In the pre-election setting, only speculation was possible to evaluate accurately if 
the confrontations over the Iraqi crisis, in the domestic Spanish scenario and in the terrain 
of EU-U.S. relations, were temporary and intimately linked and conditioned to the 
incumbent leadership (in Madrid, Washington and key European capitals). The 
alternative option was that they responded to a deeper chasm of ideological imprint in the 
Spanish national identity and the EU. Although the jury may still be out, signals given by 
important developments in the EU (a constitutional compromise in the making) and a 
reaching out by the U.S. government towards European interests and especially the new 
Spanish administration point in the direction that the confrontational attitude was and still 
is caused by a personality clash.                         
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Post-Aznar’s Reign in Spain 
 
For over a year, readers of U.S. newspapers and magazines (from interviews in The Wall 
Street Journal in September 2003 to the international edition of Newsweek) might had 
had the wrong impression that until José María Aznar came to power in 1996 Spain was a 
third world country, politically situated in an international limbo, and for centuries under 
the wings of France. Any serious observer and especially rigorous scholars could answer 
that this assessment was far from the truth. 
That explains the door slamming executed by the Spanish premier as a closing to 
the failed conference to approve the EU Constitution. Spanish philosopher Ortega y 
Gasset once said that “Spain was the problem, and Europe was the solution”. It seemed 
that now “Europe was the solution, and Spain was the problem”.  
Never mind the Spanish president. On this side of the Atlantic, Aznar benefited 
for backing the U.S. foreign policy by addressing the scantily attended joint session of 
Congress, expecting to be awarded a medal by this high legislative body, an additional 
honor that never came for lack of needed votes. It is important to recall that Aznar’s 
uncompromising support of President Bush in the Iraq war (in stark contrast with some of 
the most important European partners, and in opposition to an overwhelming majority of 
Spanish public opinion) was presented as being justified by the presence of 350 million 
Spanish speakers in the Americas, including 40 million in the United States. However, 
there is no evidence that Aznar asked any of those millions for their opinion on joining 
him in his alliance with Bush. Based on the reluctance of Latin American leadership in 
endorsing U.S. policies, an offer coming from Mr. Aznar would receive similar negative 
signals. 
The notion that Aznar was the first Spanish leader to pay attention to Hispanics in 
the United States is an example of what in Spain is called “discovering America.” In the 
American colorful expression, it was like “been there, done that”. The only difference 
with previous Spanish governments is that they did not try to teach Hispanics a lesson in 
geography and history to remind them of their ancestral roots. Past Spanish governments 
also did not attempt to read their political inclinations. Common sense says that most 
U.S.  Hispanics would choose effective social-democratic (read “liberal”) policies (free 
health care, education, retirement packages, etc.) instead of a conservative (republican) 
doctrine. 
Moreover, Aznar had been advocating for an expanded justification for a trans-
Atlantic policy instead of a deepening of the insertion of Spain in Europe, with the 
reinforcement of the relationship with Latin America, insinuating that he was a pioneer in 
that line of action. This is doubly misleading. 
Politically, the priority given to Latin America was actually inaugurated by the 
Franco regime as what was called a “substitution” policy, priming a safe scenario in the 
absence of freedom of action in a complex, democratic Western Europe that despised the 
former Hitler ally. This rapprochement with Latin America was reinforced by the centrist 
government after the end of the Franco regime (by appointing itself as “bridge” with 
Europe), and spectacularly strengthened by the Social Democratic administrations of 
1983-1996, after Spain became a member of the European Community. The foundation 
of the Ibero-American Community, lately demoted to annual summits with little 
substance, was the trade mark of that policy closely linked to the protection of human  
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rights and programs of peace making and peace keeping in Central America, while 
supporting transitions to democracy in the Southern Cone. Meanwhile, heavy weight 
officials and diplomats were assigned in Brussels to implement that vision within the EU 
institutions. Moreover, in terms of investment, what was sold by Aznar as a novelty 
nurtured by his government, was actually crafted and executed much earlier by his 
predecessors.  
Ironically, while Blair has been engaged in an investigation over the faulty 
information regarding the existence of weapons of mass destruction, and Bush has 
promised to search for the truth over the CIA reports, Aznar remained silent in explaining 
his backing for the U.S. action in Iraq, claiming that he never vouched for the existence 
of such weapons that justified the war, occupation, and current problems. Leaving office, 
Aznar passed the buck to his successor, Mariano Rajoy, destined in the polls to be the 
next prime minister. Even when expecting to be the winner, Rajoy knew very well that 
the future of his party and his country rested on a solid relationship with Spain’s 
European partners, and not in another distant location.  
However, in the case of Spanish-U.S. relations, much has to be repaired. 
Misperceptions still survive and will remain part of the scenario in a damaged 
transatlantic relationship. While a considerable important sector of public opinion and 
elite media reacted extraordinarily positive to the sudden electoral upset in Spain, others 
interpreted it in a very different way.      
  To the ideological right, the defeat of the governing PP in Spain was a 
capitulation of Spanish voters to terrorism. This over simplistic diagnosis might had 
served as a consolation for outgoing Prime Minister Aznar and his handpicked successor 
Mariano Rajoy, but it badly serves the true interests of the United States.  
To reduce the result of the election to the Madrid train bombings attack and to 
accuse the deciding voters of the victory of the PSOE of giving a blank check to the 
terrorists is inexact, unfair and patronizing. The vote was not a referendum on terrorism, 
but a choice between two political parties and two attitudes on the policy on Iraq. The 
Spanish political framework is more complex. 
On the domestic scene, some facts need to be carefully studied: 
(1) The stubborn economic arguments made by the PP for deserving reelection 
were counteracted by the high social cost to many labor sectors, unprotected by a highly 
liberalized market. Ironically, this opening of the economy was not the creation of the PP 
but was put in motion by the PSOE more than a decade ago. The high cost of housing and 
temporary jobs hurt mostly young people, who were voting for the first time. 
(2) The social and political climate was exacerbated in the last four years presided 
by an absolute majority of the PP. The public media, especially the state TV network, 
was perceived as a branch not of the government, but of the governing party.     
(3) The political consensus, a model a quarter of a century ago to approve the 
Constitution, was in shambles. Any suggestion of reforming the Constitution was met 
with disdain and accusations of unpatriotic disloyalty. Moreover, a Basque project to call 
for a referendum on independence was met by its insertion in the criminal code, a 
violation of political privilege and freedom of expression, which has been contested by an 
overwhelming number of jurists in Spain. 
(4) When a serious political crisis exploded in Catalonia over the interview held 
by Josep Lluís Carod Rovira, the leader of the independence party Esquerra Republicana,  
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with representatives of the Basque ETA terrorist organization, the PP treated all Catalans 
as accomplices of terror, and the socialist party as dealing with assassins. As an apparent 
answer to this, all Catalan parties, with the exception of the PP branch in Catalonia, have 
doubled the number of seats in the Spanish Congress. Esquerra has not only confirmed its 
expectations (from a single deputy to eight) before the attacks, but has catapulted itself to 
be the fourth political force in Spain.     
(5) The perceived arrogance displayed by the PP during the campaign contributed 
greatly to its fall. Its strategy was composed of a pincer in which Aznar and some of his 
ministers would do the dirty work, and use harsh language against the Socialists, while 
the candidate Rajoy would comfortably visit safe electoral sites and appear in the last 
minute in spectacular campaign gatherings. The selection of a rather boring personality 
was fatal for Aznar, who did not want to be upstaged even in retirement. Now, many in 
the PP are in disarray, longing for the missed opportunity of naming other personalities, 
who now feel vindicated. 
However, on the foreign scene, the fatal mistake of the government was in the 
handling of the crisis that developed when its initial interpretation that the terrorist 
attacks were the work of ETA fell apart under the heavy evidence that they were indeed 
perpetrated by a branch of Islamic fundamentalism. In a frantic campaign of perceived 
cover-up, the Spanish government lobbied foreign correspondents in Madrid until the last 
minutes, forced a declaration of the UN Security Council targeting ETA, issued 
instructions to ambassadors and the state news agency, even while the Spanish 
intelligence services were confirming Islamic authorship.  
 
New Spain 
 
The electorate’s perception oscillated from good faith to detecting manipulation and, 
something much worse for Spaniards, lies. That was the icing on the cake for citizens that 
had been waiting for evidence about the only solid reason why Aznar committed Spain to 
its alliance with President Bush –weapons of mass destruction.              
The United States government, before and after the November reelection, was 
reassured of what the new Spanish administration would offer, and still is willing to share 
with the White House. There has been unlimited willingness of cooperation, on equal 
footing, in the fight against terrorism, domestic and international, in due synchronization 
with Spain’s natural partners in the European Union. Declarations and facts show that 
Spain’s place in the world was set to continue to be the same as it has been since the 80s. 
The record speaks for itself: Spain has become the 8
th contributor to the UN budget; the 
sixth foreign investor in the world; one of leading providers of foreign assistance (by 
itself or within the EU, which commits more than half of all world development and 
humanitarian assistance).  Spain has also been centrally present in NATO since it became 
a member, contributing to peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Central 
America, participated in the first Gulf War, and has been one of the leading providers of 
troops in Afghanistan.         
Spain was in principle set to maintain its modest, symbolic (but highly important 
from the political point of view) presence in Iraq, but only first indications of the new 
Spanish government were that it would do so only under a mandate of the UN. In this 
direction were the meetings held by members of the PSOE administration and  
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declarations made by the new minister of Foreign Affairs. This move would had been 
only implemented with due backing of a stronger and more integrated European Union, 
re-anchored in a “new” Old Europe, from which Spain had escaped for a few months. 
However, the fast pace of events and the uncertainty of the U.S. attitude towards anything 
that might have seemed as conditional, propelled the decision of the Spanish government 
to elect an abrupt and strict adherence to the electoral promise. Spanish troops were 
recalled from Iraq, generating a visible disappointment (diplomatic term for anger) in 
Washington and the expressed disagreement of the previous Spanish administration. 
Public approval of the measure in Spain reached similar levels as during the war in 
opposing Spain’s siding with the United States in the Iraqi operation. 
The decision and subsequent measures sent the relations between the United 
States and Spain to unprecedented depths. Both sides executed undiplomatic moves, 
exacerbated by media manipulation and partisan opportunism. As a retaliation for PSOE 
leader Rodríguez Zapatero’s decision to remain seated when the U.S. flag was displayed 
in the October 12
th, 2003, national parade in Madrid, the U.S. ambassador declined to 
attend the following year’s event when American troops were not invited to participate. 
In a interview given while Tunisia, Zapatero made remarks recommending other nations 
to follow the Spanish example and leave the collation in Iraq, comments that immediately 
were received with animosity in Washington. In the months before the election, while the 
Spanish government remained scrupulously neutral of the outcome, numerous PSOE 
members and sympathizers, as well as a majority of the media, did not hide inclination 
towards a victory of John Kerry, a feeling well shared with the bulk of public opinion in 
Europe. However, after the November 2004 reelection, the Spanish government seemed 
to be identified as a special target for retaliatory disdain by the newly reelected president. 
Personal phone calls for congratulations remained answered. In contrast, frantic moves 
by other protagonists were set in motion, destined to either provide damage control, or, 
on the contrary, to add more fuel to the fire. 
Coincidentally, as a result of an agenda well set with months of anticipation, the 
King and Queen of Spain reformed an unofficial visit to the United States to stop for a 
whole day just before Thanksgiving at the Bush ranch in Crawford, Texas. The occasion 
was interpreted as a diplomatic way to provide for a thaw of a stormy relation between 
the two countries. According to reputable sources, King Juan Carlos, well known for his 
affable and direct treatment, open the visit with a question to President Bush, in the 
presence of his father: “Why are you so angry?” It was meant, obviously, at Zapatero. No 
immediate results were known but the tone and substance of the talks were to contribute 
to the lessening of the tensions.
23 
The same and even more direct objective had the invitation made by Spanish 
Minister of Defense José Bono to former President George H. Bush Sr., while he was in 
the home Souther Castille region of the PSOE official. Meanwhile, however, the frequent 
visits of José María Aznar to the United States have contributed to insert a controversial 
ingredient in the delicate fabric of Spain-U.S. relations. Most observers may not find 
unusual that a former official pays a visit to an incumbent in office and most especially if 
he was heavily identified as an ally in difficult times. A victorious re-elected President 
Bush has as his own right to continue with a close relationship with a friend, but the 
                                                 
23 For a selection of press reaction to this polemic, see Appendix (Bush).   
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timing of a well publicized visit to the White House was not easily interpreted by the 
Zapatero administration and was harshly treated by the Spanish media.                               
Meanwhile, in the European scene, the change of Spanish administration provided 
a respite for the constitutional stalemate generated when Spain’s premier Aznar refused 
to accept the new proposed double majority voting system to substitute for the apparently 
more advantageous Nice Treaty reapportionment of votes that gave Spain and Poland a 
prominent level just below the big four European powers. Zapatero made the positive 
move and joined a majority accepting the new simplified system of 55% of the states and 
65% of the population as conditions to pass new legislation in the Council. Spain was, in 
effect, back as part of a wider consensus that saw as a primary objective the approval of 
the Constitution, set later for the ratification by the states. This agreement became part of 
the contentious points for Aznar’s commentaries during his public appearances in the 
United States, using the occasion for lambasting what he perceived was a loss of power 
and influence of Spain in European affairs. 
 
In closing 
 
Once the new EU Commission has settled in place and the other European institutions 
have smoothly incorporated the new members, with the approval of the Constitution in 
October 2004, and the referendum process has been programmed in all over Europe 
according individual legislation, the European Union has focused on addressing the most 
urgent issues to be faced in the new term. Relations with the United States is one of the 
most important areas. Taking into account that there are many economic items that 
remain to be confrontational but will always have the potential for a settlement, the 
overall sensitive strategic relationship will need all the attention of the leadership at both 
sides of the Atlantic. Washington will realize that Spain’s destiny is heavily anchored in 
Europe and that the apparent estrangement of the last years of the Aznar administration 
was, from the historical point of view, an exception. Unless a catastrophic development 
(as a result, among other causes, of a constitutional crisis, for lack of ratification 
consensus) sends the EU in disarray in the course of the second term of President W. 
Bush the most plausible scenario is that Spain will continue to play a loyal role within the 
EU. Europe will find a way to compromise between a stance of unconditional alliance 
with the United States and a fractured attitude as a result of divisions as the one generated 
over the war in Iraq.                         
Even though the new Spanish government drastically disagrees with the U.S. 
strategy in Iraq, Madrid contributed with funds for the recent historic election and has 
pledged with training for Iraqi troops in removing antipersonnel mines, justice 
institutions and training of lawyers. This record was obviously present in the agenda of 
the discussions that took place in Brussels and other European capitals during the visit by 
new Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, in preparation for the elaborate meetings of 
President Bush in a signal of a more coherent and frank relationship. 
It is hard to predict what will be the shape of the U.S. attitude towards either a 
fractured Europe or a more cohesive and united EU, in the event of a hardening of the 
political and strategic world conditions within the context of a spillover effect of the 
doctrine as applied in Iraq. What is plausible in the Spanish context is that the drastic u-
turn performed by Aznar in 2003 will be seen as an exception. Even taking into account  
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that the PP leadership will continue to disagree in several areas of foreign policy executed 
by the PSOE government, public opinion will continue to exert considerable pressure 
regarding two areas that are still perceived as detrimental for Spanish interests: a 
diminishment of the traditional solid presence in the European Union and too close 
unconditional endorsement of the policies of the United States in scenarios such as the 
Middle East and its wider vicinity. Lack of clear explanations (besides the ones exposed 
in this monograph) for a drastic exception to this rule, will render Aznar’s decision a 
footnote in Spanish contemporary history, propelled by personal conviction.  
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